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Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action 
12-682 
Ruling Below: Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Michigan, 701 F.3d 
466 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. granted,  133 S.Ct. 1633. 
In support of affirmative action efforts, organizations and individuals with ties to Michigan state 
universities filed suits against state officials and universities to seek declaratory judgments 
stating the constitutional amendment prohibiting affirmative action in public education, 
employment, and contracting violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. After consolidation, 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan entered summary judgment 
in state's favor, denied law student's motion to intervene, and denied plaintiffs' motion to alter or 
amend judgment. 
Questions Presented: Whether a state violates the Equal Protection Clause by amending its 
constitution to prohibit race- and sex-based discrimination or preferential treatment in public-
university admissions decisions. 
 
 
COALITION TO DEFEND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, INTEGRATION AND 
IMMIGRANT RIGHTS AND FIGHT FOR EQUALITY BY ANY MEANS 
NECESSARY (BAMN), et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants, 
v. 
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, Board of Trustees of Michigan 
State University; Board of Governors of Wayne State University; Mary Sue Coleman; 
Irvin D. Reid; Lou Anna K. Simon, Defendants–Appellees 
 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
 
Decided: November 15, 2012. 
  
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted] 
COLE, Circuit Judge: 
A student seeking to have her family’s 
alumni connections considered in her 
application to one of Michigan’s esteemed 
public universities could do one of four 
things to have the school adopt a legacy-
conscious admissions policy: she could 
lobby the admissions committee, she could 
petition the leadership of the university, she 
could seek to influence the school’s 
governing board, or, as a measure of last 
resort, she could initiate a statewide 
campaign to alter the state’s constitution. 
The same cannot be said for a black student 
seeking the adoption of a constitutionally 
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permissible race-conscious admissions 
policy. That student could do only one thing 
to effect change: she could attempt to amend 
the Michigan Constitution—a lengthy, 
expensive, and arduous process—to repeal 
the consequences of Proposal 2. The 
existence of such a comparative structural 
burden undermines the Equal Protection 
Clause’s guarantee that all citizens ought to 
have equal access to the tools of political 
change. We therefore REVERSE the 
judgment of the district court on this issue 
and find Proposal 2 unconstitutional. We 
AFFIRM the denial of the University 
Defendants’ motion to be dismissed as 
parties, and we AFFIRM the grant of the 
Cantrell Plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment as to Russell. 
I. 
A. Factual Background 
[Affirmative action] challenges in the late 
1990s culminated in the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Gratz v. Bollinger, and Grutter 
v. Bollinger, which held that “universities 
cannot establish quotas for members of 
certain racial groups” or treat their 
applications uniquely.  But the Court 
allowed universities to continue 
“consider[ing] race or ethnicity more 
flexibly as a ‘plus’ factor in the context of 
individualized consideration,” along with 
other relevant factors, a holding we do not 
today address or upset. 
  
Following these decisions, Ward Connerly, 
a former University of California Regent 
who had championed a similar proposition 
in California, and Jennifer Gratz, the lead 
plaintiff in Gratz, mobilized to place on 
Michigan’s November 2006 statewide ballot 
a proposal to amend the Michigan 
Constitution “to prohibit all sex- and race-
based preferences in public education, 
public employment, and public 
contracting....” The initiative—officially 
designated Proposal 06–2 but commonly 
known as “Proposal 2”—sought “to amend 
the State Constitution to ban affirmative 
action programs.” Though Proposal 2 
“found its way on the ballot through 
methods that undermine[d] the integrity and 
fairness of our democratic processes,” once 
there, it garnered enough support among 
Michigan voters to pass by a margin of 58% 
to 42%...  
Proposal 2 took effect in December 2006 
and wrought two significant changes to the 
admissions policies at Michigan’s public 
colleges and universities.  First, it eliminated 
the consideration of “race, sex, color, 
ethnicity, or national origin” in 
individualized admissions decisions, 
modifying policies in place for nearly a half-
century. No other admissions criterion—for 
example, grades, athletic ability, geographic 
diversity, or family alumni connections—
suffered the same fate. Second, Proposal 2 
entrenched this prohibition at the state 
constitutional level, thus preventing public 
colleges and universities or their boards 
from revisiting this issue—and only this 
issue—without repeal or modification of 
article I, section 26 of the Michigan 
Constitution. 
  
B. Procedural History 
On November 8, 2006, the day after 
Proposal 2 passed, a collection of interest 
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groups and individuals, including the 
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 
Integration and Immigration Rights and 
Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary 
(“Coalition Plaintiffs”), filed suit in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan. They named as 
defendants then-Governor Jennifer 
Granholm, the Regents of the University of 
Michigan, the Board of Trustees of 
Michigan State University, and the Board of 
Governors of Wayne State University 
(“University Defendants”), and alleged that 
the provisions of Proposal 2 affecting public 
colleges and universities violated the United 
States Constitution and federal statutory law. 
The Coalition Plaintiffs limited their request 
for relief to Proposal 2 as it applies to public 
education, and did not challenge its 
constitutionality as it applies to public 
employment or public contracting. About a 
month later, the Michigan Attorney General 
(“Attorney General”) filed a motion to 
intervene as a defendant, which the district 
court granted. Shortly thereafter, Eric 
Russell, then an applicant to the University 
of Michigan Law School, and Toward A 
Fair Michigan (“TAFM”), a non-profit 
corporation formed to ensure 
implementation of Proposal 2, also filed a 
motion to intervene in the litigation. 
  
On December 19, 2006, a group of faculty 
members and prospective and current 
students at the University of Michigan 
(“Cantrell Plaintiffs”) filed a separate but 
similar suit … 
  
That same day, the district court issued what 
was, in effect, a preliminary injunction, 
postponing the application of Proposal 2 to 
the universities’ admissions and financial-
aid policies until July 1, 2007, which was 
the conclusion of the 2006–2007 admissions 
and financial-aid cycle. The district court’s 
order stemmed from a stipulation among the 
University Defendants, Coalition Plaintiffs, 
Granholm, and the Attorney General 
consenting to the injunction. While awaiting 
approval as intervenors, Russell and TAFM 
opposed the Attorney General’s stipulation 
and sought a stay of the injunction from the 
district court. When two days passed 
without a ruling on their motions, Russell 
and TAFM filed with us an “Emergency 
Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal,” which 
we granted. Meanwhile, we approved the 
district court’s decision to allow only 
Russell to intervene in the Proposal 2 
litigation. 
  
On October 5, 2007, the Cantrell Plaintiffs 
filed a motion for summary judgment as to 
Russell, arguing that he should be dismissed 
from the litigation because he no longer 
represented an interest distinct from that of 
the Attorney General. On October 17, 2007, 
the University Defendants filed a motion to 
dismiss on the ground that they were not 
necessary parties to the litigation. On 
November 30, 2007, the Attorney General 
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing 
or, in the alternative, a motion for summary 
judgment on the merits as to all Plaintiffs. 
Russell and the Cantrell Plaintiffs likewise 
filed motions for summary judgment the 
same day. 
  
On March 18, 2008, the district court issued 
two orders addressing these motions. First, 
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the court denied the University Defendants’ 
request to be dismissed as parties and the 
Cantrell Plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment. The court also granted the 
Attorney General’s motion for summary 
judgment, rejecting the Plaintiffs’ arguments 
that Proposal 2 violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Second, the court granted the Cantrell 
Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, 
dismissing Russell as an intervenor. The 
Cantrell Plaintiffs subsequently moved the 
court to reconsider the first order, but the 
court denied the motion. 
  
The Plaintiffs, the University Defendants, 
and Russell appealed these orders to this 
Court. A panel of this Court reversed the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment 
in favor of the Attorney General, concluding 
that the portions of Proposal 2 that affect 
Michigan’s public institutions of higher 
education impermissibly alter the political 
process in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.  This Court also affirmed the district 
court’s dismissal of Russell and the denial of 
the University Defendants’ motion to be 
dismissed. The Attorney General then 
sought en banc review, which we granted, 
vacating the panel opinion. 
  
 
II. 
A. Constitutionality of Proposal 2 
The Plaintiffs argue that Proposal 2 violates 
[the Equal Protection Clause] in two distinct 
ways. Both Plaintiff groups argue that 
Proposal 2 violates the Equal Protection 
Clause by impermissibly restructuring the 
political process along racial lines (the 
“political process” argument), and the 
Coalition Plaintiffs additionally argue that 
Proposal 2 violates the Equal Protection 
Clause by impermissibly classifying 
individuals on the basis of race (the 
“traditional” argument). 
  
In addressing the Plaintiffs’ arguments, we 
are neither required nor inclined to weigh in 
on the constitutional status or relative merits 
of race-conscious admissions policies as 
such…  
  
We review de novo a district court’s grant of 
summary judgment and denial of a motion 
for reconsideration of that decision.  
Whether a state’s constitution violates the 
federal constitution is a question of law, 
which we also review de novo.  
1. Equal Protection Within the Political 
Process 
The Equal Protection Clause “guarantees 
racial minorities the right to full 
participation in the political life of the 
community. It is beyond dispute ... that 
given racial or ethnic groups may not be 
denied the franchise, or precluded from 
entering into the political process in a 
reliable and meaningful manner.” 
Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 
U.S. 457, 467 (1982). But the Equal 
Protection Clause reaches even further, 
prohibiting “a political structure that treats 
all individuals as equals, yet more subtly 
distorts governmental processes in such a 
way as to place special burdens on the 
ability of minority groups to achieve 
beneficial legislation.”   “[T]he State may no 
more disadvantage any particular group by 
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making it more difficult to enact legislation 
in its behalf than it may dilute any person’s 
vote or give any group a smaller 
representation than another of comparable 
size.” Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393 
(1969). 
  
The Supreme Court’s statements in Hunter 
and Seattle emphasize that equal protection 
of the laws is more than a guarantee of equal 
treatment under existing law…. Ensuring the 
fairness of the political process is 
particularly important because an electoral 
minority is disadvantaged by definition in its 
attempts to pass legislation; this is especially 
true of “discrete and insular minorities,” 
who face unique additional hurdles. 
  
Ensuring a fair political process is nowhere 
more important than in education. Education 
is the bedrock of equal opportunity and “the 
very foundation of good citizenship.” Brown 
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
Safeguarding the guarantee “that public 
institutions are open and available to all 
segments of American society, including 
people of all races and ethnicities, represents 
a paramount government objective.” 
…Therefore, in the high-stakes context of 
education, we must apply the political-
process doctrine with the utmost rigor. 
  
Of course, the Constitution does not protect 
minorities from political defeat… We must 
therefore have some way to differentiate 
between the constitutional and the 
impermissible. And Hunter and Seattle 
provide just that. They set the benchmark for 
when the majority has not only won, but has 
rigged the game to reproduce its success 
indefinitely. 
a. Hunter v. Erickson 
In Hunter, the citizens of Akron, Ohio, 
overturned a fair housing ordinance enacted 
by the City Council. [T]he citizens amended 
the city charter through a referendum to 
require the approval of an electoral majority 
before any ordinance regulating real estate 
“on the basis of race, color, religion, 
national origin or ancestry”—past or 
future—could take effect. In other words, 
only ordinances based on those factors 
required a city-wide majority; ordinances 
based on any other factor required just a 
vote by the City Council… 
The referendum halted operation of the 
existing fair housing ordinance, and more 
importantly for our purposes, erected a 
barrier to any similar ordinance in the future.  
  
The Supreme Court found that the disparity 
between the process for enacting a future 
fair housing ordinance and the process for 
enacting any other housing ordinance 
“place[d] special burden[s] on racial 
minorities within the governmental process” 
by making it “substantially more difficult to 
secure enactment” of legislation that would 
be to their benefit.… 
b. Washington v. Seattle School District 
No. 1 
In Seattle, a case that mirrors the one before 
us, the Supreme Court applied Hunter to 
strike down a state statute, also enacted via a 
referendum, that prohibited racially 
integrative busing. Seattle, 458 U.S. at 463. 
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Prior to the referendum, Seattle School 
District No. 1 (“District”) had implemented 
a school desegregation plan that made 
extensive use of mandatory reassignments… 
[T]he school board implemented the plan to 
accelerate its existing program of voluntary 
busing, which some constituencies  saw as 
insufficiently alleviating racial imbalances. 
  
In response, Seattle residents drafted a 
statewide measure—known as Initiative 
350—providing in relevant part that “no 
school board ... shall directly or indirectly 
require any student to attend a school other 
than the school which is geographically 
nearest or next nearest the student’s place of 
residence....” Though the initiative was 
framed as a general ban on mandatory 
busing, its myriad exceptions made its real 
effect the elimination of school 
reassignments for racial purposes only, 
except where a court ordered such 
reassignments to remedy unconstitutional 
segregation. Initiative 350 made it on the 
Washington ballot and passed by a 
substantial margin.  
  
The Court found that Initiative 350, like the 
Akron city charter amendment, violated the 
Equal Protection Clause. The Court stated 
that its prior cases yielded a “simple but 
central principle”: while “laws structuring 
political institutions or allocating political 
power according to neutral principles” do 
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, “a 
different analysis is required when the State 
allocates governmental power nonneutrally, 
by explicitly using the racial nature of a 
decision to determine the decisionmaking 
process.” Seattle, 458 U.S. at 469–70. 
Echoing Hunter, the Court explained that 
this distinct analysis is necessary because 
non-neutral allocations of power “place [ ] 
special burdens on racial minorities within 
the governmental process, thereby making it 
more difficult for certain racial and religious 
minorities than for other members of the 
community to achieve legislation that is in 
their interest… 
   
In sum, Hunter and Seattle require us to 
examine an enactment that changes the 
governmental decisionmaking process for 
legislation with a racial focus to determine if 
it improperly manipulates the channels for 
change. To the extent that it does, we must 
strike down the enactment absent a 
compelling state interest. 
 
2. Application of the Hunter/Seattle Test to 
Proposal 2 
Hunter and Seattle thus expounded the rule 
that an enactment deprives minority groups 
of the equal protection of the laws when it: 
(1) has a racial focus, targeting a policy or 
program that “inures primarily to the benefit 
of the minority”; and (2) reallocates political 
power or reorders the decisionmaking 
process in a way that places special burdens 
on a minority group’s ability to achieve its 
goals through that process. See Seattle, 458 
U.S. at 467, 472, 102 S.Ct. 3187; Hunter, 
393 U.S. at 391, 89 S.Ct. 557. Applying this 
rule here, we conclude that Proposal 2 
targets a program that “inures primarily to 
the benefit of the minority” and reorders the 
political process in Michigan in a way that 
places special burdens on racial minorities. 
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a. Racial Focus 
The first prong of the Hunter/Seattle test 
requires us to determine whether Proposal 2 
has a “racial focus.” This inquiry turns on 
whether the targeted policy or program, here 
holistic race-conscious admissions policies 
at public colleges and universities, “at 
bottom inures primarily to the benefit of the 
minority, and is designed for that 
purpose.”…  
  
Seattle conclusively answers whether a law 
targeting policies that seek to facilitate 
classroom diversity, as Proposal 2 does, has 
a racial focus. In Seattle, the Court observed 
that programs intended to promote school 
diversity and further the education of 
minority children enable these students to 
“achieve their full measure of success.”… 
Accordingly, the Court noted that 
“desegregation of the public schools ... at 
bottom inures primarily to the benefit of the 
minority....” Because minorities could 
“consider busing for integration to be 
‘legislation that is in their interest,’ ” the 
Court concluded that Initiative 350’s 
effective repeal of such programs had a 
racial focus sufficient to “trigger application 
of the Hunter doctrine.”  
  
The logic of the Court’s decision in Seattle 
applies with equal force here. Proposal 2 
targets race-conscious admissions policies 
that “promote [ ] ‘cross-racial 
understanding,’ help[ ] to break down racial 
stereotypes, and ‘enable[ ] students to better 
understand persons of different races.’ ”… 
There is no material difference between the 
enactment in Seattle and Proposal 2, as both 
targeted policies that benefit minorities by 
enhancing their educational opportunities 
and promoting classroom diversity…  
  
Seattle not only mandates our conclusion 
that Proposal 2 is racially focused, but it also 
dispels any notion that the benefit race-
conscious admissions policies may confer 
on the majority undercuts its “racial focus.” 
Although it is true that increased 
representation of racial minorities in higher 
education benefits all students, the Supreme 
Court has made clear that these policies still 
have a racial focus.  
… 
  
We find that the holistic race-conscious 
admissions policies now barred by Proposal 
2 inure primarily to the benefit of racial 
minorities, and that such groups consider 
these policies to be in their interest. Indeed, 
we need not look further than the approved 
ballot language—characterizing Proposal 2 
as an amendment “to ban affirmative action 
programs”—to confirm that this legislation 
targets race-conscious admissions policies 
and, insofar as it prohibits consideration of 
applicants’ race in admissions decisions, that 
it has a racial focus.  
b. A Reordering of the Political Process 
That Burdens Racial Minorities 
The second prong of the Hunter/Seattle test 
asks us to determine whether Proposal 2 
reallocates political power or reorders the 
political process in a way that places special 
burdens on racial minorities. We must first 
resolve (1) whether the affected admissions 
procedures lie within the “political process,” 
and then (2) whether Proposal 2 works a 
“reordering” of this political process in a 
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way that imposes “special burdens” on racial 
minorities. 
i. Proposal 2’s Effect on a “Political 
Process” 
The breadth of Proposal 2’s influence on a 
“political process” turns on the role the 
popularly elected governing boards of the 
universities play in setting admissions 
procedures. The key question is whether the 
boards had the power to alter the 
universities’ admissions policies prior to the 
enactment of Proposal 2. If the boards had 
that power and could influence the use (or 
non-use) of race-conscious admissions 
policies, then Proposal 2’s stripping of that 
power works a reordering of the political 
process because minorities can no longer 
seek to enact a type of legislation that is in 
their interest at the board level. But if board 
members lacked such power, because policy 
decisions are actually under the control of 
politically unaccountable faculty members 
or admissions committees, then Proposal 2’s 
effect on the political process is negligible… 
   
The Michigan Constitution establishes three 
public universities—the University of 
Michigan, Michigan State University, and 
Wayne State University—and grants control 
of each to a governing board.  These boards 
have the same role: to run, with plenary 
authority, their respective institutions. 
Michigan law has consistently confirmed 
this absolute authority… 
  
Eight popularly elected individuals sit on 
these boards, and they hold office for eight 
years. The boards have the “power to enact 
ordinances, by-laws and regulations for the 
government of the university.  Exercising 
this power, the boards have enacted 
bylaws—which they have complete 
authority to revise or revoke—detailing 
admissions procedures. 
  
The University of Michigan’s bylaws 
delegate the day-to-day management of 
undergraduate admissions to the associate 
vice provost and executive director of 
undergraduate admissions. Although the 
board delegates this responsibility, it 
continues to exercise ultimate 
decisionmaking authority because it directly 
appoints the associate vice provost and 
executive director of undergraduate 
admissions,  and because it retains the power 
to revoke or alter the admissions framework. 
Nothing prevents the board from adopting 
an entirely new framework for admissions 
decisions if it is so inclined… 
  
[T]he board fulfills its general supervisory 
role by conducting monthly public meetings 
to remain apprised of all university 
operations and by exercising its power to 
amend bylaws or revise delegations of 
responsibility. At these meetings, the board 
regularly discusses admissions practices, 
including the use of race-conscious 
admissions policies. Thus, the elected 
boards of Michigan’s public universities 
can, and do, change their respective 
admissions policies, making the policies 
themselves part of the political process. But 
even if they did not, the Attorney General 
provides no authority to support his 
contention that an unused power is a power 
abandoned. 
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Nevertheless, the Attorney General argues, 
echoed by the dissenters, that admissions 
decisions lie outside the political process 
because the governing boards of the 
universities have “fully delegated” 
responsibility for establishing admissions 
standards to politically unaccountable 
admissions committees and faculty 
members. But the Michigan Constitution, 
state statutes, and the universities’ bylaws 
and current practices directly contradict this 
argument…  
  
Moreover, to the extent the Attorney 
General and the dissenters express concern 
over the degree to which the board has 
delegated admissions decisions, that 
delegation does not affect whether 
admissions decisions should be considered 
part of the political process…  
  
Telling evidence that board members can 
influence admissions policies—bringing 
such policies within the political process—is 
that these policies can, and do, shape the 
campaigns of candidates seeking election to 
one of the boards. As the boards are 
popularly elected, citizens concerned with 
race-conscious admissions policies may 
lobby for candidates who will act in 
accordance with their views—whatever they 
are. Board candidates have, and certainly 
will continue, to include their views on race-
conscious admissions policies in their 
platforms… Once elected, the new slate may 
revise the bylaws, and change their 
university’s admissions policies—either by 
entirely revoking the delegation and 
handling all admissions policies at the board 
level or by enacting new bylaws giving 
more explicit direction to admissions 
committees. Thus, Proposal 2 affects a 
“political process.” 
ii. Reordering of a “Political Process” 
The next issue is whether Proposal 2 
reordered the political process in a way that 
places special burdens on racial minorities. 
The Supreme Court has found that both 
implicit and explicit reordering violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment…  
  
The comparative structural burden we face 
here is every bit as troubling as those in 
Hunter and Seattle because Proposal 2 
creates the highest possible hurdle. This 
comparative structural burden is most 
apparent in tracing the channels for change 
available to a citizen promoting any policy 
unmodified by Proposal 2 and those 
available to a citizen promoting 
constitutionally permissible race-conscious 
admissions policies. 
  
An interested Michigan citizen may use any 
number of avenues to change the admissions 
policies on an issue outside the scope of 
Proposal 2…  
 
Because Proposal 2 entrenched the ban on 
all race-conscious admissions policies at the 
highest level, this last resort—the campaign 
for a constitutional amendment—is the sole 
recourse available to a Michigan citizen 
who supports enacting such policies… Just 
to place a proposed constitutional 
amendment repealing Proposal 2 on the 
ballot would require either the support of 
two-thirds of both the Michigan House of 
Representatives and Senate, or the 
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signatures of a number of voters equivalent 
to at least ten percent of the number of votes 
cast for all candidates for governor in the 
preceding general election.  Once on the 
ballot, the proposed amendment must then 
earn the support of a majority of the voting 
electorate to undo Proposal 2’s categorical 
ban.  
  
Only after traversing this difficult and costly 
road would [a] citizen reach the starting 
point of his neighbor who sought a legacy-
related admissions policy change. After [a] 
successful constitutional amendment 
campaign, [a] citizen could finally approach 
the university—by petitioning the 
admissions committees or higher 
administrative authorities—to request the 
adoption of race-conscious admissions 
policies. By amending the Michigan 
Constitution to prohibit university 
admissions units from using even modest 
race-conscious admissions policies, Proposal 
2 thus removed the authority to institute any 
such policy from Michigan’s universities 
and lodged it at the most remote level of 
Michigan’s government, the state 
constitution. As with the unconstitutional 
enactment in Hunter, proponents of race-
conscious admissions policies now have to 
obtain the approval of the Michigan 
electorate and, if successful, admissions 
units or other university powers—whereas 
proponents of other non-universal 
admissions factors need only garner the 
support of the latter.  
 
The “simple but central principle” of Hunter 
and Seattle is that the Equal Protection 
Clause prohibits requiring racial minorities 
to surmount more formidable obstacles than 
those faced by other groups to achieve their 
political objectives… As the Supreme Court 
has recognized, such special procedural 
barriers to minority interests discriminate 
against racial minorities just as surely as—
and more insidiously than—substantive 
legal barriers challenged under the 
traditional equal protection rubric. Because 
less onerous avenues to effect political 
change remain open to those advocating 
consideration of nonracial factors in 
admissions decisions, Michigan cannot force 
those advocating for consideration of racial 
factors to traverse a more arduous road 
without violating the Fourteenth 
Amendment. We thus conclude that 
Proposal 2 reorders the political process in 
Michigan to place special burdens on 
minority interests. 
3. Objections to the Applicability of the 
Hunter/Seattle Doctrine to Proposal 2 
The Attorney General and the dissenters 
make a number of arguments as to why 
Proposal 2 survives constitutional scrutiny. 
At the outset, it should be noted that 
adopting these arguments as to Proposal 2’s 
constitutionality would be particularly 
ironic, given that these arguments applied 
with equal force to Initiative 350 in Seattle. 
While distinctions obviously exist between 
the policy at issue here and that in Seattle, 
the factual differences are not so material as 
to justify departure from relevant Supreme 
Court precedent. 
a. Hunter/Seattle Doctrine and 
Preferential Treatment Programs 
The Attorney General and the dissenters 
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assert that Hunter and Seattle are 
inapplicable to Proposal 2 because those 
cases only govern enactments that burden 
racial minorities’ ability to obtain protection 
from discrimination through the political 
process, whereas Proposal 2 burdens racial 
minorities’ ability to obtain preferential 
treatment. At bottom, this is an argument 
that an enactment violates the Equal 
Protection Clause under Hunter and Seattle 
only if the political process is distorted to 
burden legislation providing 
constitutionally-mandated protections, such 
as anti-discrimination laws. Under this 
theory, a state may require racial minorities 
to endure a more burdensome process than 
all other citizens when seeking to enact 
policies that are in their favor if those 
policies are constitutionally permissible but 
not constitutionally required. This effort to 
drive a wedge between the political-process 
rights afforded when seeking 
antidiscrimination legislation and so-called 
preferential treatment is fundamentally at 
odds with Seattle. 
  
The only way to find the Hunter/Seattle 
doctrine inapplicable to the enactment of 
preferential treatment is to adopt a strained 
reading that ignores the preferential nature 
of the legislation at issue in Seattle, and 
inaccurately recast it as anti-discrimination 
legislation…  
 
The distinction urged by the Attorney 
General and the dissenters [] erroneously 
imposes an outcome-based limitation on a 
process-based right. What matters is 
whether racial minorities are forced to 
surmount procedural hurdles in reaching 
their objectives over which other groups do 
not have to leap. If they are, the disparate 
procedural treatment violates the Equal 
Protection Clause, regardless of the 
objective sought. 
b. Proposal 2 as a Mere Repeal 
Latching on to the Supreme Court’s 
observation that “the simple repeal or 
modification of desegregation or 
antidiscrimination laws, without more, never 
has been viewed as embodying a 
presumptively invalid racial classification,” 
Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 539 
(1982), the Attorney General implores us to 
classify Proposal 2 as a mere repeal of the 
universities’ race-conscious admissions 
policies, rather than the kind of political 
restructuring that implicates the 
Hunter/Seattle doctrine. Crawford, a case 
decided the same day as Seattle, emphasizes 
the difference between mere repeals and 
political restructuring; state actors must 
retain the power to repeal policies without 
running afoul of the political-process 
doctrine—certainly not every policy 
elimination carries with it a political-process 
violation. Crawford brings this difference 
into focus, because the Court-approved 
political action in that case (amendment of 
the California Constitution) occurred at the 
same level of government as the original 
enactment (a prior amendment of the 
California Constitution), thus leaving the 
rules of the political game unchanged.  
  
The Supreme Court has twice distinguished 
the “mere repeal” at issue in Crawford from 
the political reordering at issue in Hunter 
and Seattle. The Crawford Court 
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distinguished Hunter by clarifying that the 
charter amendment in Hunter was 
“something more than a mere repeal” 
because it not only repealed an ordinance 
adopted by the popularly elected City 
Council, it removed from the Council the 
power to reinstate it—more than just 
undoing an unpopular act, the electorate in 
Hunter had altered the framework of the 
political process. The Seattle Court drew the 
same distinction between the Washington 
State legislation and the California 
amendment… 
  
Here, the rules are not the same after 
Proposal 2. Rather than undoing an act of 
popularly elected officials by simply 
repealing the policies they created, Michigan  
voters repealed the admissions policies that 
university officials created and took the 
additional step of permanently removing the 
officials’ power to reinstate them. In short, 
Proposal 2 “works something more than the 
‘mere repeal’ of a desegregation law by the 
political entity that created it.”… 
 
More generally, the dissenting opinions 
criticize our holding today in broad and 
strident terms. At their core, these opinions 
express disapproval of the political-process 
doctrine itself, dissatisfaction that Grutter 
allowed for even modest race-conscious 
admissions policies, and incredulity at the 
possibility that a state constitutional 
amendment forbidding consideration of race 
could violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
But Hunter and Seattle have not been 
overruled; Grutter continues to permit the 
same holistic race-conscious admissions 
policies Proposal 2 seeks to permanently 
eliminate; and courts must decide equal 
protection challenges by application of 
precedent, rather than resort to syllogism. 
Most importantly, our holding does not 
place race-conscious admissions policies 
beyond the political process. Opponents of 
affirmative action remain free to advocate 
for their preferred policies in the same 
manner and at the same level of government 
as its proponents. 
4. Constitutionality of Proposal 2 Under 
the Political–Process Doctrine 
Proposal 2 modifies Michigan’s political 
process “to place special burdens on the 
ability of minority groups to achieve 
beneficial legislation.”  Because Proposal 2 
fails the Hunter/ Seattle test, it must survive 
strict scrutiny. Under the strict scrutiny 
standard, the Attorney General must prove 
that Proposal 2 is “necessary to further a 
compelling state interest.” In Seattle, the 
Court did not consider whether a compelling 
state interest might justify a state’s 
enactment of a racially-focused law that 
restructures the political process, because 
the government made no such argument. 
Likewise, because the Attorney General 
does not assert that Proposal 2 satisfies a 
compelling state interest, we need not 
consider this argument. Therefore, those 
portions of Proposal 2 that affect Michigan’s 
public institutions of higher education 
violate the Equal Protection Clause.  
5. Traditional Equal Protection Analysis 
Having found that Proposal 2 deprives the 
Plaintiffs of equal protection of the law 
under the political-process doctrine, we need 
not reach the question of whether it also 
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violates the Equal Protection Clause when 
assessed using the “traditional” analysis. 
B. The University Defendants’ Non–
Dismissal 
The University Defendants appeal the 
district court’s denial of their motion to be 
dismissed as misjoined parties under Rule 
21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
We review the district court’s decision for 
an abuse of discretion and must affirm 
unless we are “left with a definite and firm 
conviction that the trial court committed a 
clear error of judgment.”  
  
…Because a motion to be dismissed under 
Rule 21 tracks Rule 20(a), we must ask 
whether the Coalition Plaintiffs have 
satisfied the rules for permissive joinder…  
  
The district court concluded that the 
University Defendants were properly joined 
parties under Rule 20(a) because the 
Coalition Plaintiffs asserted a request for 
relief on a claim involving common issues 
of law and fact. The district court found that 
“the claims brought against the universities 
are intertwined with those challenging 
Proposal 2,” and “[i]f [the court] were to 
find Proposal 2 unconstitutional, affirmative 
action would not automatically be reinstated 
into the admissions process. Rather, the 
universities would have to choose to do so 
on their own.” Because the Coalition 
Plaintiffs’ traditional equal protection claim 
could have required the University 
Defendants to grant relief by reinstating 
race-conscious admissions policies, the 
district court found Rule 20(a) satisfied and 
concluded that dismissal as a misjoined 
party was not appropriate. 
  
The discretionary language of Rule 21, 
coupled with our deferential standard of 
review, presents a high hurdle for reversal of 
the district court’s determinations. The 
Coalition Plaintiffs asserted a right to relief 
against the University Defendants, and so 
we are not “left with a definite and firm 
conviction that the trial court committed a 
clear error of judgment,” and affirm the 
district court’s denial of the University 
Defendants’ motion. 
C. Dismissal of Russell as an Intervenor 
Intervening Defendant Russell appeals the 
district court’s decision granting the Cantrell 
Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment to 
dismiss him from the case because he no 
longer satisfied the requirements for 
intervention. We review de novo a district 
court’s grant of summary judgment…  
  
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
24(a), an interested party must meet four 
requirements before being permitted to 
intervene as of right: (1) his motion to 
intervene must be timely; (2) he must have a 
substantial legal interest in the subject 
matter of the case; (3) he must demonstrate 
that his interest will be impaired in the 
absence of intervention; and (4) he must 
demonstrate that the parties already before 
the court do not adequately represent his 
interest.  An intervenor also must continue 
to meet these requirements throughout the 
duration of the litigation, as courts must be 
able to ensure that parties have a live interest 
in the case.  
  
 108 
Although Russell met all four requirements 
when he was permitted to intervene, it has 
become apparent during the course of 
litigation that Russell can no longer 
demonstrate that the parties already before 
the court do not adequately represent his 
interests… Russell’s intervention in this 
litigation is no longer proper and we affirm 
the district court’s grant of the Cantrell 
Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment to 
dismiss him. 
III. 
Finding those provisions of Proposal 2 
affecting Michigan’s public colleges and 
universities unconstitutional, we REVERSE 
the district court’s judgment granting the 
Defendants–Appellees’ motion for summary 
judgment. We further AFFIRM the district 
court’s denial of the University Defendants’ 
motion to be dismissed as parties, and 
AFFIRM the district court’s grant of the 
Cantrell Plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment as to Russell. 
DANNY J. BOGGS, Circuit Judge, 
dissenting. 
 
In 1848, the relevant local authority, the 
Boston School Board, decided that race 
should be used in making assignments in the 
Boston public schools. They excluded and 
segregated black students. However, in 1855 
the ultimate political authority, the 
legislature of Massachusetts, established the 
general principle against racial 
discrimination in educational choices. The 
legislature was lauded for that choice.  
  
Over 100 years later, various Michigan local 
and subordinate state authorities began to 
implement policies of racial discrimination 
in decisions on, inter alia, educational 
admissions. The Supreme Court of the 
United States held that such actions were 
permissible, but certainly not that they were 
compelled. Subsequently, the ultimate state 
political authority, the People of Michigan, 
voted to establish the same principle that 
Massachusetts did in 1855…  
  
The majority of the en banc court now holds 
that this action of the People of Michigan 
was unconstitutional, relying on an extreme 
extension of two United States Supreme 
Court cases ruling on very different 
circumstances. 
  
To begin with, those two cases each 
involved a single action that transferred, for 
the first time, decision making on a single 
matter, a transfer held to be wholly aimed at 
one disadvantaged race. In one instance, 
approval of new anti-discrimination 
ordinances was moved from the city council 
to the voters of the city of Akron, and in the 
other case, power over certain pupil 
assignment policies was moved from the 
citizens of one city in the state of 
Washington to the citizens of the entire 
state. 
  
In our case, however, we have the citizens of 
the entire state establishing a principle that 
would in general have seemed laudable. 
Even plaintiffs here do not allege, in the 
context of their political-process argument, 
that if this constitutional provision had been 
enacted at some earlier time in Michigan, for 
example upon its entry into the union, or 
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upon the enactment of its new constitution 
in 1963, that it would have been 
unconstitutional. They instead contend that 
because of current circumstances, and 
intervening political decisions of racial 
discrimination, these Supreme Court cases 
make the principled action of the People of 
Michigan unconstitutional. 
  
Indeed, the majority seems to concede that 
some set of decision makers in Michigan 
would be able to reverse the policies that 
they claim are immune from actions by the 
entire body politic. Rather, they demand that 
any changes in the educational (and perhaps 
employment) policies here can be enacted 
only by individual actions of each of the 
university governing authorities (three of 
which are chosen by statewide election over 
eight years), each regional state university 
(whose governing boards are appointed on a 
staggered basis by the governor over eight 
years), and each local educational authority 
for community and technical schools (whose 
governing authorities are chosen by a variety 
of methods by each individual county and 
locality)… 
   
In addition, the situation in Michigan, in 
which the various local authorities are 
permitted (under Grutter) to engage in 
varieties of racial discrimination, both for 
and against variously defined groups, is 
wholly at odds with the single-instance 
restructuring of government involved in the 
Supreme Court precedents relied on by the 
majority. 
  
Here, it was clear from the evidence in the 
Grutter case, and in the record in this case, 
discrimination may be practiced in favor of 
certain racially or ethnically defined 
minorities, primarily African–Americans (or 
perhaps those deemed to be “black,” 
whether or not actually “American”) or 
“Hispanics” (although there was some 
evidence that some groups generally defined 
as “Hispanic” (especially Cuban) might be 
discriminated against rather than in favor of. 
On the other hand, various groups, 
sometimes defined as racial minorities, may 
be discriminated against. 
  
Under these circumstances, holding it to be a 
violation of equal protection for the ultimate 
political authority to declare a uniform 
policy of non-discrimination is vastly far 
afield from the Supreme Court precedents… 
   
I cannot agree that this decision is correct, 
either as a matter of general constitutional 
law or as an accurate interpretation of the 
Supreme Court precedents. I therefore 
respectfully DISSENT. 
JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit 
Judge, dissenting. 
 
Proposal 2 is not unconstitutional under 
either a political restructuring theory or 
under traditional equal protection analysis. I 
therefore respectfully dissent. 
I. 
Elementary principles of constitutional law 
tell us that plaintiffs’ challenge to Proposal 2 
should have little to no chance of success. 
Plaintiffs argue that Michigan must retain its 
racial and other preference policies in higher 
education and that the state’s voters cannot 
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make the contrary policy choice that factors 
like race and gender may not be taken into 
account in admissions. They make this 
argument in the face of the core equal 
protection principle of nondiscrimination—a 
principle consistent with the choice of the 
people of Michigan. They make the 
argument despite the absence of any 
precedent suggesting that states must 
employ racial preferences in university 
admissions. Essentially, the argument is one 
of constitutional protection for racial and 
gender preference—a concept at odds with 
the basic meaning of the Equal Protection 
Clause, as understood and explained through 
decades of jurisprudence. 
  
Although it has convinced a majority of this 
court, plaintiffs’ argument must be 
understood for the marked departure it 
represents—for the first time, the 
presumptively invalid policy of racial and 
gender preference has been judicially 
entrenched as beyond the political process. 
In reaching its conclusion, the majority 
strays from analysis bounded by familiar 
principles of constitutional law and loses 
sight of the parameters within which we 
should operate in deciding this case. To be 
accurate in characterizing the majority’s 
approach, it relies on two Supreme Court 
cases, which it deems highly instructive. 
Yet, when examined carefully, these cases 
have no application here, and, in 
emphasizing them, the majority overlooks 
recent case law providing more relevant 
guidance. 
II. 
The political restructuring theory on which 
the majority relies does not invalidate 
Proposal 2…  
  
In holding that student-body diversity is a 
compelling state interest that can justify the 
narrowly tailored use of race in university 
admissions policies, Grutter set forth three 
principles about race-based admissions 
policies that bear repeating here. First, 
Grutter reminded us that “ ‘[a] core purpose 
of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do 
away with all governmentally imposed 
discrimination based on race’ ” and that, as a 
consequence, “race-conscious admissions 
policies must be limited in time.” This 
principle makes sense because all “racial 
classifications are presumptively invalid....” 
Second, Grutter indicated that the decision 
to end race-conscious admissions policies is 
primarily one to be made by states and their 
public universities, not courts. And third, 
while racially conscious admissions policies 
are permitted, they are not constitutionally 
required. 
A. 
With these core principles in mind we 
examine the applicability of Hunter and 
Seattle to the passage of Proposal 2 in 
Michigan…  
 
Because Hunter considered only the 
political-process implications of repealing a 
law that required equal treatment, it cannot 
be read broadly to apply to the repeal of a 
law requiring preferential treatment. As we 
have observed, “[t]hese are fundamentally 
different concepts.” Thus, Hunter does not 
guide us here. 
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Nor does Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 
No. 1, suggest application of the political 
restructuring doctrine to Proposal 2… 
Accordingly, Proposal 2 is quite unlike the 
narrow anti-busing measure struck down in 
Seattle; it represents “a sea change in state 
policy, of a kind not present in Seattle or any 
other ‘political structure’ case.”  
  
The majority is quick to conclude that 
Proposal 2 and Initiative 350 each target 
policies—affirmative action and integrative 
busing, respectively—that “inure[ ] 
primarily to the benefit of the minority” and 
therefore each has a “racial focus.” But in a 
political-restructuring challenge, it is not 
enough to observe that some of the policies 
affected by the challenged enactment 
primarily benefit minorities. Nor is it 
enough to observe that, as here, the 
challenged enactment was passed in 
response to a high-profile case permitting 
racially conscious admissions policies under 
some circumstances. Though relevant, these 
observations are alone insufficient: in a 
political restructuring case, it is imperative 
to consider the scope of the challenged 
enactment itself. The majority fails to 
account for the broad substantive reach of 
Proposal 2 when compared to the narrow 
focus of Initiative 350 and, in so doing, 
improperly stretches the political 
restructuring doctrine that Seattle articulates 
to the instant case… 
B. 
In concluding that a race-based 
classification that is presumptively invalid, 
but permissible under limited circumstances 
and for a finite period of time, receives the 
same structural protections against statewide 
popular repeal as other laws that inure to the 
interest of minorities, the majority walks 
alone. The two highest courts to have 
considered the question have concluded that 
the political restructuring doctrine of Hunter 
and Seattle does not prevent the statewide 
popular elimination of race-based 
classification policies. … 
  
[E]qual treatment is the baseline rule 
embodied in the Equal Protection Clause, 
from which racial-preference programs are a 
departure. These programs—fundamentally 
different from the underlying policies in 
Hunter and Seattle—cannot receive special 
sanctuary from a decision of the majority of 
voters to return their law to the equal 
protection norm of equal treatment. 
III. 
There is another reason that Hunter and 
Seattle cannot forbid the amendment of the 
Michigan Constitution through the passage 
of Proposal 2. In both cases the relevant 
lawmaking authority was reallocated from a 
local legislative body to the “more complex 
government structure,” of the city- or state-  
wide general electorate, thereby placing a 
“comparative structural burden ... on the 
political achievement of minority 
interests.”… As the record here 
demonstrates, the people of Michigan have 
not restructured the state’s lawmaking 
process in the manner prohibited by Hunter 
and Seattle. Instead, their vote removed 
admissions policy from the hands of 
decisionmakers who were unelected and 
unaccountable to either minority or majority 
interests and placed it squarely in an 
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electoral process in which all voters, both 
minority and majority, have a voice. 
A. 
Public higher education in Michigan is 
unique in that “[t]he Michigan Constitution 
confers a unique constitutional status on 
[Michigan’s] public universities and their 
governing boards.” These boards are “the 
highest form of juristic person known to the 
law, a constitutional corporation of 
independent authority, which, within the 
scope of its functions, is coordinate with and 
equal to that of the legislature.” … 
   
The governing boards have fully delegated 
the responsibility for establishing 
admissions standards to several program-
specific administrative units within each 
institution, which set admissions criteria 
through informal processes that can include 
a faculty vote… 
  
[T]he majority emphasizes that the boards—
although they have fully delegated their 
decisionmaking power to admissions 
directors and faculty—can revoke this 
authority and can revise any bylaw in order 
to effect changes in university admission 
policies. … 
B. 
The decisionmaking structure at the 
universities is important because these 
program-specific faculty admissions 
committees are far afield from the legislative 
bodies from which lawmaking authority was 
removed in Hunter and Seattle. To 
appreciate this critical difference, we need 
look no further than Seattle itself. 
  
In Seattle, the Court emphasized that the 
type of action it found objectionable was the 
creation of comparative burdens “on 
minority participation in the political 
process.”  The Seattle majority, however, 
did not view state university admissions 
committees as a part of the “political 
process” in the manner of an elected school 
board or city council. A dialogue between 
the majority and dissent in Seattle is 
particularly instructive on this point. In 
dissent, Justice Powell, critiquing the 
potential breadth of the majority’s holding, 
argued: 
Thus, if the admissions committee of 
a state law school developed an 
affirmative-action plan that came 
under fire, the Court apparently 
would find it unconstitutional for any 
higher authority to intervene unless 
that authority traditionally dictated 
admissions policies. As a 
constitutional matter, the dean of the 
law school, the faculty of the 
university system as a whole, the 
university president, the chancellor 
of the university, and the board of 
regents might be powerless to 
intervene despite their greater 
authority under state law. 
The majority, however, flatly dismissed this 
concern as a misunderstanding of the court’s 
decision: “It is evident, then, that the 
horribles paraded by the dissent, which have 
nothing to do with the ability of minorities to 
participate in the process of self-
government—are entirely unrelated to this 
case.”  
  
For the Seattle majority, then, an 
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impermissible reordering of the political 
process meant a reordering of the processes 
through which the people exercise their right 
to govern themselves. 
  
Thus, the academic processes at work in 
state university admissions in Michigan are 
not “political processes” in the manner 
contemplated in Seattle...  
  
Of course, when an elected body delegates a 
power, it does not automatically follow that 
the delegatee’s decisions fall outside the 
political process. But that is not the point. 
…  
  
Although the majority appears to see no 
reason to distinguish between the unelected 
and unresponsive program-specific faculty 
admissions committees here and the 
legislative bodies from which lawmaking 
authority was removed in Hunter and 
Seattle, a consideration of political 
accountability in the political process is 
squarely grounded in the Seattle opinion. In 
Seattle, the Court undertook a close 
examination of Washington’s system of 
“establish[ing] the local school board, rather 
than the State, as the entity charged with 
making decisions of the type at issue,”: 
But Washington has chosen to meet its 
educational responsibilities primarily 
through “state and local officials, 
boards, and committees,” and the 
responsibility to devise and tailor 
educational programs to suit local needs 
has emphatically been vested in the 
local school boards. 
Thus “each common school district 
board of directors” is made 
“accountable for the proper operation 
of its district to the local community 
and its electorate.” To this end, each 
school board is “vested with the final 
responsibility for the setting of policies 
ensuring quality in the content and the 
extent of its educational program.” 
It was only upon its consideration of the 
state statutory structure’s vesting of 
decisionmaking in local and politically 
accountable school boards that the Court 
could conclude that “placing power over 
desegregative busing at the state level ... 
restructured the Washington political 
process.” Taking this into account, it is 
difficult to conclude that, in amending their 
state constitution to prohibit the use of racial 
preferences in university admissions, the 
people of Michigan modified “the 
community’s political mechanisms ... to 
place effective decisionmaking authority 
over a racial issue at another level of 
government.”…  
  
In short, Michigan has chosen to structure its 
university system such that politics plays no 
part in university admissions at all levels 
within its constitutionally created 
universities. The Michigan voters have 
therefore not restructured the political 
process in their state by amending their state 
constitution; they have merely employed it. 
IV. 
Finally, it is plain that Proposal 2 does not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause under a 
traditional approach to equal protection. 
“The central purpose of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the 
prevention of official conduct discriminating 
on the basis of race.” We apply strict 
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scrutiny to laws that (1) include a facial 
racial classification or (2) have a 
discriminatory impact and a discriminatory 
purpose. Proposal 2, which prohibits racial 
classifications, a fortiori does not classify 
facially on the basis of race. As to 
discriminatory impact and purpose, the 
district court did find “sufficient evidence to 
establish a fact question on the disparate 
impact part of the test” but found no 
discriminatory purpose. Indeed, it stated that 
“the demonstration of a discriminatory 
purpose ... dooms [the] conventional equal 
protection argument” because it “cannot [be] 
sa[id] that the only purpose of Proposal 2 is 
to discriminate against minorities.” The 
district court’s conclusions are correct. 
“[A]bsent a referendum that facially 
discriminates racially, or one where 
although facially neutral, the only possible 
rationale is racially motivated, a district 
court cannot inquire into the electorate’s 
motivations in an equal protection clause 
context.” Thus, no heightened level of 
scrutiny need be applied to Proposal 2, and 
under rational basis review, Proposal 2 is 
easily justifiable. Proposal 2 does not violate 
the Equal Protection Clause under the 
conventional analysis. … 
VI. 
For these reasons, I would conclude that 
Proposal 2 does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the United States 
Constitution under either a political 
restructuring theory or traditional theory of 
equal protection. Accordingly, I would 
affirm the judgment of the district court. 
  
[ROGERS, Circuit Judge, dissent omitted] 
SUTTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
I join Judge Gibbons’ dissent and write 
separately to make a few additional points. 
  
Today’s lawsuit transforms a potential virtue 
of affirmative action into a vice. If there is 
one feature of affirmative-action programs 
that favors their constitutionality, it is that 
they grow out of the democratic process: the 
choice of a majority of a State’s residents to 
create race-conscious admissions 
preferences at their public universities not to 
benefit a majority race but to facilitate the 
educational opportunities of disadvantaged 
racial minorities. Such democratically 
enacted programs, like all democratically 
enacted laws, deserve initial respect in the 
courts, whether the particulars of a program 
satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment. 
  
Yet this lawsuit turns these assumptions on 
their head. Democracy, it turns out, has 
nothing to do with it. Plaintiffs insist that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of 
“equal protection of the laws” imposes two 
new rules on the policy debates surrounding 
affirmative action in higher education. Rule 
one: States not only may establish race-
conscious affirmative-action programs, but 
they must do so to comply with the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Rule two: even if 
the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
mandate that States establish affirmative-
action programs at their public universities, 
it bars them from eliminating such programs 
through amendments to their constitutions. 
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A. 
The first theory has little to recommend it, 
so little that the notion of mandatory 
affirmative action will come as a surprise to 
all Justices of the United States Supreme 
Court, past and present, who have labored to 
determine whether state universities may 
ever enact such race-conscious programs 
under the United States Constitution… 
  
Plaintiffs nonetheless insist that, “to the 
extent that [Proposal 2] ... bar[s] race or 
gender conscious programs that would be 
permissible under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it violates the Equal Protection 
Clause.” Yet the words of the one 
amendment (prohibiting the State from 
“discriminat[ing] ... on the basis of race”) 
cannot violate the words of the other (“nor 
shall any State deny to any person ... the 
equal protection of the laws”). 
  
That is especially true in the context of 
classifications based on race, which are 
presumptively unconstitutional and which 
must run the gauntlet of strict scrutiny to 
survive. If racial preferences are only 
occasionally and barely constitutional, it 
cannot be the case that they are always 
required. A State that wishes to treat citizens 
of all races and nationalities equally “is free 
as a matter of its own law” to do so. A first 
premise for resolving this case is, and must 
be, that a State does not deny equal 
treatment by mandating it. 
B. 
The claimants’ other theory is of a piece. 
Having argued that the people of Michigan 
may not resort to the political process to 
eliminate racial preferences because the 
Fourteenth Amendment demands them, the 
claimants alternatively insist that the 
“political process doctrine” of the 
Fourteenth Amendment separately prohibits 
the State from eliminating such programs 
already in existence by way of a state 
constitutional amendment. That is not much 
of an alternative, as it comes to the same 
end. More fundamentally, the argument 
misapprehends what States may do as a 
matter of “politics” and “process.”…  
   
By any reasonable measure, Proposal 2 does 
not place “special burdens” on racial 
minorities. It bans “discriminat[ing] against, 
or grant[ing] preferential treatment to, any 
individual or group on the basis of race, sex, 
color, ethnicity, or national origin in the 
operation of public employment, public 
education, or public contracting.” That is not 
a natural way to impose race-based burdens. 
The words of the amendment place no 
burden on anyone, and indeed are designed 
to prohibit the State from burdening one 
racial group relative to another. All of this 
furthers the objectives of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the same seed from which the 
political-process doctrine sprouted. 
  
That the people of Michigan made this 
change through their Constitution, as 
opposed to state legislation or a new policy 
embraced by the governing boards at the 
three state universities, does not impose a 
“special burden” on any racial minority. 
There is nothing unusual about placing an 
equal-protection guarantee in a 
constitution... 
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I do not doubt that Proposal 2 places a 
burden on proponents of affirmative action: 
They no longer have access to it, and they 
must amend the constitution to get it back. 
But the Fourteenth Amendment insists only 
that all participants in the debate have an 
equal shot… It would be paradoxical if 
something called the “political process 
doctrine” insulated one side of a vigorous 
policy debate from a timeless rule of 
politics: win some, lose some…  
  
Another oddity of this theory is that it would 
apply even if the Michigan Constitution 
eliminated affirmative-action programs in 
another way. In 1963, the people of 
Michigan passed an earlier amendment to 
their Constitution, one that prohibited race 
discrimination by governmental entities. In 
view of this prohibition, a Michigan resident 
surely would have the right to bring a claim 
that the State Constitution’s existing 
prohibition on race-based classifications 
bars a system of racial preferences in 
admissions, contracting and employment. If 
there is one thing that the closely divided 
decisions in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, Gratz and Grutter illustrate, it is that 
the Michigan Supreme Court could 
reasonably invalidate, or reasonably uphold, 
racial preferences under the State 
Constitution’s existing equal-protection 
guarantee. A decision invalidating racial 
preferences, however, would have precisely 
the same effect as Proposal 2, establishing 
that the Constitution bars racial preferences 
and placing the onus on proponents of racial 
preferences to alter the Constitution. The 
claimants have no answer to this point. If 
Proposal 2 violates the political-process 
doctrine, so too would a decision by the 
Michigan Supreme Court that comes to the 
same end through a permissible 
interpretation of the 1963 equal-protection 
guarantee… 
   
The Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans,  
which did not concern racial classifications, 
holds nothing to the contrary. Colorado 
enacted a constitutional amendment 
prohibiting the State and its municipalities 
from enacting laws banning discrimination 
on the basis of “homosexual, lesbian or 
bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or 
relationships.” In invalidating the 
amendment, the Court noted that the 
amendment “impos[es] a broad and 
undifferentiated disability” (the inability to 
seek protection from discrimination at the 
state or local level) “on a single named 
group” (gays and lesbians). The amendment 
“was inexplicable by anything but animus 
toward the class it affects” and therefore 
“lack[ed] a rational relationship to legitimate 
state interests.” By contrast, Proposal 2 
serves a rational interest, indeed a 
compelling one: eliminating racial 
classifications in admissions, public 
employment and public contracting. 
  
The Court’s decisions in Hunter and Seattle, 
which did concern racial classifications, also 
hold nothing to the contrary. The laws 
invalidated in both cases were designed to 
disadvantage one minority group—African-
Americans—and no other…  
  
The same cannot be said of Proposal 2. In 
the first place, Proposal 2 removes racial 
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preferences, not anti-discrimination 
measures. To the extent Proposal 2 has any 
effect on the political structures through 
which a group may acquire special treatment 
in university admissions, it is a leveling 
one… If ever there were a neutral, non-
special burden, that is it. The Equal 
Protection Clause freely permits 
governments to ban racial discrimination, as 
here, but it does not freely permit them to 
ban all bans on racial discrimination, as in 
Hunter and Seattle. 
  
In the second place, Proposal 2 prohibits 
discrimination not just on the basis of race 
but also on the basis of sex, ethnicity and 
national origin. To the extent it 
disadvantages anyone, it disadvantages 
groups that together account for a majority 
of Michigan’s population, not this or that 
racial minority. It “make[s] little sense to 
apply ‘political structure’ equal protection 
principles where the group alleged to face 
special political burdens itself constitutes a 
majority of the electorate.”  
 
Nor is it even clear which groups—men or 
women, this racial group or that one—
Proposal 2 helps and hurts, or when each 
group will be affected. Perhaps there was a 
time when a ban on gender-based 
preferences favored men…  
  
It is no answer to say that Michigan may 
adopt a statewide policy regarding racial 
preferences if, and only if, they adopt 
statewide policies on other admissions 
policies—from how much weight to give 
Advanced Placement courses to how many 
zoology students to admit to how to treat 
children of alumni to how to treat football 
players, oboists or thespians. The Equal 
Protection Clause reflects our collective 
judgment that generalizations based on race 
are dubious in the near term and destructive 
in the long term, making it appropriate to 
treat racial proxies, which are presumptively 
unconstitutional, differently from other 
more-pedestrian distinctions, which are 
presumptively constitutional.  It does not bar 
Michigan from recognizing the same. 
  
Any doubt that Hunter and Seattle support 
rather than undermine the constitutionality 
of Proposal 2 is removed by Seattle, the last 
of the two decisions. In Seattle, Justice 
Powell, no stranger to affirmative-action 
debates, raised the concern that the 
majority’s reasoning meant that, “if the 
admissions committee of a state law school 
developed an affirmative-action plan that 
came under fire, the Court apparently would 
find it unconstitutional for any higher 
authority to intervene unless that authority 
traditionally dictated admissions policies.” 
No worries, the majority responded: The 
problem with Washington’s anti-busing 
initiative was “the burden it impose[d] on 
minority participation in the political 
process,” a consideration that made Justice 
Powell’s hypothetical “entirely unrelated to 
this case” because it had “nothing to do with 
the ability of minorities to participate in the 
process of self-government.” If the Court 
thought that the removal of an affirmative-
action policy was “entirely unrelated” to the 
concerns in Seattle, then I am hard-pressed 
to understand why the same is not true in 
this instance—and just as hard-pressed to 
understand how anyone can insist our hands 
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are tied in today’s case. The companion 
political-process case to Seattle, handed 
down the same day, confirmed the point. 
The “Equal Protection Clause,” it made 
clear, “is not violated by the mere repeal of 
race-related legislation or policies that were 
not required by the Federal Constitution in 
the first place.” That is all that happened 
here. The majority seeing it differently, I 
respectfully dissent. 
GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
Today’s decision is the antithesis of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The post-Civil War 
amendment that guarantees equal protection 
to persons of all races has now been 
construed as barring a state from prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of race… I join 
Judge Gibbons’ dissent, except for Section 
III, and write separately to emphasize that 
the “political structure” doctrine is an 
anomaly incompatible with the Equal 
Protection Clause. I urge the Supreme Court 
to consign this misguided doctrine to the 
annals of judicial history. 
  
The Equal Protection Clause provides that 
“[n]o State shall ... deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.” Under its application, a state law 
is subject to strict scrutiny when it explicitly 
distinguishes between individuals on the 
basis of race…  
  
Facially neutral laws, on the other hand, 
warrant strict scrutiny only if they are 
“motivated by a racial purpose or object,”  
  
The ill-advised “political structure” doctrine 
employed by the majority in this case was 
crafted by the Supreme Court more than one 
hundred years after the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Before today, the 
cases fitting its mold numbered three: 
Hunter v. Erickson,Washington v. Seattle 
Sch. Dist. No. 1,and Lee v. Nyquist. The 
infrequent use of the doctrine is not 
surprising given its lack of a constitutional 
basis. It replaces actual evidence of racial 
motivation with a judicial presumption and, 
hence, is an aberration inconsistent with the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
  
The laws at issue in Hunter and Seattle were 
both facially neutral. Yet, in each case, the 
Supreme Court held that strict scrutiny 
applied without any need for the respective 
plaintiffs to show that the laws were enacted 
as a result of discriminatory intent or were 
inexplicable on grounds other than race. It 
simply declared that there was an “ 
‘explicitly racial classification’ ” where the 
prior law inured to the benefit of racial 
minorities, and the newly enacted law 
moved the applicable decisionmaking 
process to a more remote level of 
government.  
  
These decisions are justifiably characterized 
as “jurisprudential enigmas that seem to lack 
any coherent relationship to constitutional 
doctrine as a whole.” “In the absence of a 
federal constitutional violation requiring 
race-specific remedies, a policy of strict 
racial neutrality by a State ... violate[s] no 
federal constitutional principle.”  
  
Moreover, as first noted by Justice Powell, 
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the political structure doctrine 
unconstitutionally suspends our normal and 
necessary democratic process by prohibiting 
change when a lower level of state 
government has acted in a way that arguably 
benefits racial minorities. … 
   
Finally, in an effort to avoid confusion and 
aid further review, I note the limits of the 
majority’s holding. My colleagues do not 
declare MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26 
unconstitutional in its entirety. Rather, their 
holding is limited to “racial minorities” and 
our court’s declaration “[f]inding those 
provisions of Proposal 2 affecting 
Michigan’s public colleges and universities 
unconstitutional....” Thus, the other 
provisions of MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26 
that prohibit discrimination and preferential 
treatment on the basis of sex, ethnicity, or 
national origin in the operation of public 
employment, public education, and public 
contracting, survive this court’s ruling. 
Further, the Michigan constitutional 
prohibitions against discrimination or 
preferential treatment based on race, except 
in the operation of public colleges and 
universities regarding “racial minorities,” 
remain in effect. In this regard, art. I, § 26(7) 
contains a severability clause: “Any 
provision held invalid shall be severable 
from the remaining portions of this section.” 
  
I caution that because the term “racial 
minorities” is not defined by the majority 
opinion, the class of persons benefitting 
from it is unclear and will be a potent source 
of litigation were it allowed to stand. Under 
today’s en banc decision, not all persons are 
entitled to the equal protection of the laws. 
  
For these reasons, I would affirm the district 
court and therefore respectfully dissent. 
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“Supreme Court Takes New Case on Affirmative Action, From Michigan” 
New York Times 
March 25, 2013 
Adam Liptak 
The Supreme Court on Monday added a new 
affirmative action case to its docket. It 
is already considering a major challenge to 
the University of Texas’ race-conscious 
admissions program. 
The new case, Schuette v. Coalition to 
Defend Affirmative Action, No. 12-682, 
concerns a voter initiative in Michigan that 
banned racial preferences in admissions to 
the state’s public universities. In November, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit, in Cincinnati, ruled that the 
initiative, which amended the State 
Constitution, violated the federal 
Constitution’s equal protection clause. 
The initiative, approved in 2006 by 58 
percent of the state’s voters, prohibited 
discrimination or preferential treatment in 
public education, government contracting 
and public employment. Groups favoring 
affirmative action sued to block the part of 
the law concerning higher education. 
The appeals court majority said the problem 
with the law was that it restructured the 
state’s political process by making it harder 
for disfavored minorities to press for 
change. 
“A student seeking to have her family’s 
alumni connections considered in her 
application to one of Michigan’s esteemed 
public universities could do one of four 
things to have the school adopt a legacy-
conscious admissions policy: she could 
lobby the admissions committee, she could 
petition the leadership of the university, she 
could seek to influence the school’s 
governing board, or, as a measure of last 
resort, she could initiate a statewide 
campaign to alter the state’s Constitution,” 
Judge R. Guy Cole Jr. wrote for the 
majority. 
“The same cannot be said,” Judge Cole 
added, “for a black student seeking the 
adoption of a constitutionally permissible 
race-conscious admissions policy. That 
student could do only one thing to effect 
change: she could attempt to amend the 
Michigan Constitution — a lengthy, 
expensive and arduous process — to repeal 
the consequences of Proposal 2.” 
A dissenting member of the court, Judge 
Jeffrey S. Sutton, wrote that the majority 
had it backward. “A state does not deny 
equal treatment by mandating it,” he said. 
The majority opinion, he added, “transforms 
a potential virtue of affirmative action into a 
vice.” 
“If there is one feature of affirmative action 
programs that favors their constitutionality,” 
he said, “it is that they grow out of the 
democratic process.” 
In urging the Supreme Court to hear the 
case, Bill Schuette, Michigan’s attorney 
general, said the Sixth Circuit decision was 
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“exceedingly odd” in saying, in essence, that 
the government must engage in affirmative 
action. 
A brief filed by the American Civil Liberties 
Union defended the decision. 
“The vice of Proposal 2,” the brief said, “is 
that it selectively shuts off access to the 
ordinary political processes for advocates of 
otherwise permissible race-conscious 
policies.” 
The decision the Supreme Court will review 
was decided by an 8-to-7 vote. The eight 
judges in the majority were all nominated by 
Democratic presidents. The seven judges in 
dissent were all nominated by Republican 
presidents. (Judge Helene N. White, who 
was in the majority, was initially nominated 
by President Bill Clinton and was later 
renominated by President George W. Bush 
as part of a compromise involving several 
nominations.) 
The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, in San Francisco, came to the 
opposite conclusion in 1997, upholding the 
state’s ban on racial preferences in higher 
education and saying it “would be 
paradoxical” to rule otherwise. The 
court reaffirmed that ruling in 2010. 
The case the Supreme Court agreed to hear 
on Monday will be considered in the term 
that starts in October. A decision in the 
Texas case is expected shortly. 
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“Affirmative Action in Texas and Michigan” 
SCOTUSblog 
May 1, 2013 
Stephen Wermiel 
When the Supreme Court agreed in February 
2012 to hear the University of Texas 
undergraduate admissions case, there was no 
question that the appeal set up a major test 
of affirmative action. But why, with that 
case still lingering on the docket as the only 
undecided case from the Court’s October 
sitting, would the Justices agree to hear a 
second affirmative action case, this one from 
Michigan, to be argued next fall? 
The short answer is that the two cases are 
totally different. 
Just how they differ and what the Court may 
consider in each of the cases is worth 
exploring. The answer may be of interest to 
students of the Supreme Court and to those 
interested in civil rights law and affirmative 
action. 
The Texas case, Fisher v. University of 
Texas, is at this point the better known of the 
two.  The case is a challenge to an 
affirmative action plan in which race is 
taken into account as a factor for admission 
to the University of Texas. Most of the 
undergraduate places in the entering class 
are filled through a plan which guarantees a 
spot to any student who graduates in the top 
ten percent of a Texas high school. But the 
remaining slots – about nineteen percent of 
the total spaces – are filled by a second 
program that considers race among other 
factors to promote diversity in the make-up 
of smaller classes and academic 
departments. 
Abigail Fisher, who is Caucasian, applied 
for admission to the university.  But she was 
not in the top ten percent of her class, and 
she did not receive one of the remaining 
slots.  She then challenged her denial of 
admission, arguing that she was a victim of 
discrimination based on her race in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause. Both the federal district 
court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit upheld the Texas plan. 
In the Supreme Court, Fisher’s lawyer 
disclaimed any interest in having the 
Justices reverse their 2003 decision, Grutter 
v. Bollinger, upholding the limited use of 
affirmative action at the University of 
Michigan Law School. Instead, he asked the 
Court to strike down the university’s use of 
race to fill the remaining slots and to clarify 
that it goes beyond the very narrow 
circumstances in which race may be taken 
into account. 
Ordinarily, if another affirmative action case 
came along while the Texas appeal was 
awaiting decision, the Justices would hold 
the second case until they decide the first. 
Then the Court would either grant the 
second case, vacate the ruling, and send it 
back to the lower court to apply the newly 
announced rule or, perhaps, grant the second 
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case if there are additional issues to be 
addressed. 
But the Court did neither of those things 
with Schuette v. Coalition to Defend 
Affirmative Action, involving affirmative 
action in Michigan.  Instead, it granted the 
petition for certiorari on March 25 without 
waiting to decide Fisher first. 
The reason is that Schuette presents 
affirmative action issues in an entirely 
different context. The case involves a 
challenge to Proposal 2, an amendment to 
the Michigan Constitution, approved by 
voters in 2006, that banned affirmative 
action in the state. The statewide ban was 
challenged by a coalition of groups and 
individuals who support the continued use of 
affirmative action in Michigan. Other 
lawsuits were filed as well, but a federal 
district court largely upheld the ban enacted 
by the voters. 
The appeal roiled the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit, where a three-judge 
panel initially struck down the affirmative 
action ban by a two-to-one vote. Then the 
full Sixth Circuit agreed that Proposal 2 was 
unconstitutional, ruling eight to seven in an 
en banc decision that the voters had violated 
the Equal Protection Clause. The ruling by 
the full appeals court produced five separate 
dissenting opinions. The Supreme Court 
agreed to hear the appeal, and argument in 
the case will be held next fall. 
The two cases are, in a sense, mirror images 
of one another. The Texas case asks whether 
the use of affirmative action violates the 
Equal Protection Clause. The Michigan 
case, by contrast, asks whether the ban on 
affirmative action violates the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
The Sixth Circuit ruled in the Michigan case 
that because race-based affirmative action is 
still permitted by the Constitution, a 
decision by the voters of the state to prohibit 
this remedy distorts the political process and 
imposes a burden based on race that violates 
the Equal Protection Clause. The ruling 
turns not on the Court’s long line of 
affirmative action cases but rather on a 
shorter set of precedents holding that 
individuals may not have their ability to 
participate in and influence the political 
process made more difficult because of their 
race. The Sixth Circuit found that amending 
the state constitution made it 
unconstitutionally difficult to advocate for 
the lawful remedy of affirmative action. 
That the Texas and Michigan cases are 
different is underscored in the legal 
arguments. The Sixth Circuit opinion does 
not cite the Fisher case at all. And the only 
reference to Fisher in the Supreme Court 
appeal of the Michigan case is in a footnote 
in the petition by Michigan Attorney 
General Bill Schuette which says, “This case 
presents the different issue whether a state 
has the right to accept this Court’s invitation 
in Grutter to bring an end to all race-based 
preferences.” The invitation is a reference to 
the suggestion by former Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor in Grutter that affirmative action 
should have an end point, perhaps twenty-
five years after the 2003 Grutter decision. 
Yet saying that the two cases are different 
and do not rely on one another is a strangely 
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unsatisfying answer. If the Supreme Court 
were to virtually abolish affirmative action 
inFisher, for example, that might seem to 
obviate the need for a ruling in the Michigan 
case. 
At the same time, it also seems odd to think 
that the Court may not say anything in the 
Texas case that will have an impact on the 
Michigan case. Of course, the fact that the 
Court granted the Michigan case does not 
preclude the Justices from saying something 
in the Texas decision that is relevant to the 
Michigan appeal. 
What lies ahead in this volatile field is 
uncertain, then. When the Court granted the 
Michigan petition in March, there was 
speculation that the Texas ruling must be 
imminent or that the Court would dismiss 
the Texas case for procedural reasons – 
specifically, that Abigail Fisher has now 
graduated from another university, although 
she still seeks damages. 
One thing the two cases share in common is 
that Justice Elena Kagan is not participating 
in either one, leaving an eight-Justice Court 
to wrestle with the important issues. With 
only eight participants and a Court closely 
divided over issues of race, there are myriad 
possibilities for how these cases might come 
out. Stay tuned this spring for the Texas 
ruling, and probably a year from now for 
Michigan. 
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“U.S. Court Takes Small Step to Bridge Ideological Divide” 
Reuters 
Joan Biskupic 
June 25, 2013 
It may never be clear what happened behind the 
scenes at the U.S. Supreme Court to yield 
Monday's compromise decision upholding 
university affirmative action. The case was 
heard in October, the first month of the term, 
and as the months went by and the justices 
deliberated in secret, the suspense grew. 
Would this conservative-dominated court end 
university affirmative action? Closely watching 
were supporters who emphasized that education 
remains a gateway to opportunity for long-
excluded blacks and Hispanics, as well as critics 
who said racial policies are unfair and no longer 
required in multicultural America. 
In the end, Monday's ruling was a modest one 
that took the smallest of steps. Written by Justice 
Anthony Kennedy, the 7-1 ruling permits 
admissions officers to continue considering 
applicants' race to ensure campus diversity. That 
it took more than eight months - until the last 
week of the term - suggests protracted 
discussions and special care went in to garnering 
the support of justices across the ideological 
divide. 
But even as the justices found common ground 
in the University of Texas case, they ensured 
that the last chapters of the national struggle 
with race have yet to be written. They already 
have a related racially charged case from 
Michigan on the calendar for next term and the 
legal standard voiced in Monday's decision 
could eventually bring the Texas race-based 
admissions policy back to the high court. 
The role of the country's highest court in the 
decades-long affirmative action saga has never 
been easy and its series of tightly decided 
rulings reflect the country's ambivalence. 
For now, the court has left intact the scaffolding 
of the historic 1978 opinion in Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke, which first 
voiced the diversity rationale, and a 2003 
decision, Grutter v. Bollinger, which vigorously 
affirmed the value of diversity. Both of those 
cases were decided on 5-4 votes. 
The justices cast some doubt on the University 
of Texas' racial admissions, however, by saying 
that lower court judges had too generously 
deferred to university officials. Monday's ruling 
ordered the lower appeals court to reconsider its 
stance upholding the admissions. 
CONSERVATIVES, LIBERALS JOIN 
TOGETHER 
The opinion was joined by Chief Justice John 
Roberts and three other conservative justices 
who have criticized racial remedies, and by two 
liberals, including Justice Sonia Sotomayor, a 
Latina who attended Princeton and Yale law 
school on affirmative action and has touted the 
value of such programs. 
But tensions plainly linger. Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, the only justice to dissent from the 
decision ordering a tougher lower-court review 
of the Texas program, read portions of her 
opinion from the bench on Monday. She said the 
majority should have simply upheld the Texas 
policy. Addressing broadly the value of racial 
policies, Ginsburg, the senior liberal on the 
bench, said, "State universities need not blind 
themselves to the still lingering, every day 
evident, effects of centuries of law-sanctioned 
 126 
inequality." 
Among the spectators in the white marble 
courtroom was Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, 
whose 2003 decision in Grutter v. Bollinger was 
at stake - and remained largely preserved for 
now. The retired 83-year-old justice sat with her 
hands clasped on her lap while Kennedy 
outlined the majority opinion. 
When O'Connor penned her decision in the 2003 
case from the University of Michigan, the 
majority expected the decision to hold for about 
25 years, "when the use of racial preferences 
will no longer be necessary to further the interest 
approved today." 
Advocates on both sides thought the end might 
come sooner than the O'Connor majority had 
supposed, given the interests of the Roberts 
court. 
Abigail Fisher, a white suburban Houston 
student, began Monday's lawsuit, claiming she 
was wrongly rejected by the university when 
minorities with similar test scores and grades 
were admitted. The current majority took the 
Texas case though university officials said the 
case was procedurally flawed because Fisher 
decided to go to Louisiana State University, 
from which she graduated last year. 
The challenged program that considers 
applicants' race supplements a Texas policy 
guaranteeing admission to the Austin flagship 
campus for high school graduates scoring in the 
top 10 percent of their individual schools. 
Administrators contended the 10 percent 
program did not make the university sufficiently 
diverse. 
DIVERSITY VALUED 
The ideological makeup of the court suggested it 
might be ready to roll back affirmative action. 
Justice Kennedy had dissented from the 2003 
University of Michigan dispute, and O'Connor 
was succeeded by Justice Samuel Alito, far more 
conservative on racial policies and the U.S. 
Constitution's equality guarantee. 
But, on this go-round, both accepted the 2003 
decision. 
"The attainment of a diverse student body," 
Kennedy wrote, "serves values beyond race 
alone, including enhanced classroom dialogue 
and the lessening of racial isolation and 
stereotypes." 
Liberal justices Sotomayor and Stephen Breyer 
were ready to sign on, possibly enticed by 
Kennedy's acceptance of the basic framework of 
the 2003 Grutter decision. The court's fourth 
liberal, Elena Kagan, did not participate because 
of her involvement in the dispute as U.S. 
solicitor general before she joined the bench in 
2010. 
In the term that begins next October, the justices 
will hear a case testing the constitutionality of a 
statewide ban on race-based affirmative action 
in public education, employment and 
contracting. Michigan voters adopted the 
prohibition in 2006. A Supreme Court decision 
that upholds it could embolden affirmative 
action opponents. But such a decision would 
affect only Michigan and the few other states 
that have such bans. 
A broader decision that affects campuses 
nationwide would have to come in another case. 
For now, university policies aimed at racial 
diversity remain constitutional. Said University 
of Virginia law professor John Jeffries, 
biographer of Justice Lewis Powell who was the 
author of Bakke, said of Monday's decision, "It 
leaves the Powell position (for) diversity ... 
alive, with a chance to fight again another day." 
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“6th Circuit: Proposal 2 Unconstitutional” 
The Michigan Daily 
November 15, 2012 
Rayza Goldsmith 
The court issued an 8-7 decision to overturn 
a state ballot initiative — commonly known 
as Proposal 2, which was voted into law in 
2006 — that banned the use of “preferential 
treatment” in state decisions regarding 
university admissions or employment on the 
basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity or national 
origin. 
The ruling was made by all 15 judges on the 
6th Circuit Court of Appeals, at the request 
of Michigan Attorney General Bill Schuette, 
a defendant in the case. A three-judge panel 
of the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals made an 
initial ruling against Proposal 2 in July 2011. 
The majority ruled that the ban on the basis 
of race is a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution and therefore unconstitutional. 
The decision overturns a previous decision 
made by the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit, 
which ruled Proposal 2 to be constitutional. 
The majority opinion was based on two 
primary arguments, rested on the argument 
that admissions decisions can be considered 
a part of the political process. Judge R. Guy 
Cole Jr. wrote for the majority, arguing that 
Proposal 2 is unconstitutional based on the 
fact that it primarily harms minorities by 
reordering the political process and placing 
undue burden on them. 
“Because less onerous avenues to effect 
political change remain open to those 
advocating consideration of non-racial 
factors in admissions decisions, Michigan 
cannot force those advocating for 
consideration of racial factors to traverse a 
more arduous road without violating the 
Fourteenth Amendment,” Cole wrote. “We 
thus conclude that Proposal 2 reorders the 
political process in Michigan to place 
special burdens on minority interests.” 
Law Prof. Mark Rosenbaum, who helped 
argue the case on behalf of the plaintiffs, 
said he was overwhelmed by the decision 
and excited about its implications. 
“It’s a landmark civil rights issue,” 
Rosenbaum said. “It is not about the 
constitutionality of affirmative action; it is a 
bigger story than that. It’s about access to 
the political process. It is about whether or 
not a popular initiative can cut minorities — 
people of color — out of the political 
process.” 
Rosenbaum said even if the defendants, 
including Schuette, appeal the decision, the 
ruling will take immediate effect, meaning 
the University could choose to use race as a 
factor in admissions decisions. 
In a statement, Schuette said he intends to 
appeal the decision to the U.S. Supreme 
Court on the basis that the Michigan Civil 
Rights Initiative — the amended section of 
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the constitution that effectively banned 
affirmative action — is not only 
constitutional, but also approved by a 
majority of Michigan voters. 
“MCRI embodies the fundamental premise 
of what America is all about: equal 
opportunity under the law,” Schuette said. 
“Entrance to our great universities must be 
based upon merit. We are prepared to take 
the fight for quality, fairness and the rule of 
law to the U.S. Supreme Court.” 
In order to have the case heard at the 
Supreme Court level, Schuette must file a 
petition of certiorari within 90 days of 
Thursday’s decision. 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Danny 
Boggs drew on the fact that Proposal 2 was 
enacted by voters to make his case. 
“We have the citizens of the entire state 
establishing a principle that would, in 
general, have seemed laudable,” Boggs 
wrote. 
Boggs also wrote in the dissent that the 
majority’s case was a stretch and relied on 
tenuous precedent. 
He responded to the majority’s assertion that 
admissions decisions fall within the jurisdiction 
of political processes, contending that such an 
argument does not have historical backing and 
that Proposal 2 is inherently not discriminatory. 
“Under these circumstances, holding it to be 
a violation of equal protection for the 
ultimate political authority to declare a 
uniform policy of non-discrimination is 
vastly far afield from the Supreme Court 
precedents,” Boggs wrote. 
In a statement, University spokesman Rick 
Fitzgerald said the University is reviewing 
the decision, but because there are multiple 
lengthy opinions, it could take some time to 
fully understand the ruling's implications. 
George Washington, an attorney for By Any 
Means Necessary — a pro-affirmative 
action group that helped argue the case 
before the court — said he would like to see 
a turnaround from the drop in minority 
enrollment as a result of the decision. 
“It is a tremendous victory for black and 
Latino students and for the movement that 
fought for affirmative action for many 
years,” Washington said. “It means that 
thousands of black, Latino and Native 
American students who would not have the 
chance to go to our most selective colleges 
will now have that chance.” 
Residential College Prof. Carl Cohen, a 
leading proponent of Michigan’s Proposal 2, 
said the majority opinion is incorrect in its 
assertion that Proposal 2 violates the Equal 
Protection Clause because it places an undue 
burden on those who seek preference, 
adding that the opinion is based on 
ludicrous, circuitous logic. 
“The argument upon which the 6th Circuit 
Court of Appeals based its reversal is 
absolutely unbelievable,” Cohen said. 
“That's really acrobatic, that the 
constitutional amendment that says you may 
not give preferences violates the 
constitutional amendment that says you may 
not give preference.” 
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“Supreme Court is Urged to Reject Michigan Affirmative Action Ban” 
Los Angeles Times 
David Savage 
August 30, 2013 
California Atty. Gen. Kamala Harris urged the 
Supreme Court on Friday to strike down a 
Michigan voter initiative that bans "preferential 
treatment" based on race in its state colleges and 
universities, a ruling that would likely invalidate 
a similar ban approved by California's voters in 
1996. 
These bans on affirmative action "violate the 
Equal Protection Clause" of the Constitution, 
Harris said, by "erecting barriers to the adoption 
of race-conscious admissions policies." 
For a second term in a row, the high court is set 
to consider a major test of affirmative action in 
state universities. In June, the court revived a 
white student's challenge to a race-based 
admissions policy at the University of Texas. In 
October, the court will consider a constitutional 
challenge that comes from the opposite 
direction. Lawyers representing black and other 
minority students are contesting Michigan's ban 
on affirmative action. 
Separately, the University of California's 
president and 10 chancellors filed their own 
brief Friday highlighting the ban on affirmative 
action. "More than 15 years after Proposition 
209 barred consideration of race in admissions 
decisions … the University of California still 
struggles to enroll a student body that 
encompasses the broad racial diversity of the 
state," they said. 
In 2006, Michigan's voters approved Proposition 
2, 58% to 42%. Using the words of the 
California measure, the ban said Michigan's 
public universities "shall not discriminate 
against, or grant preferential treatment to, any 
individual or group on the basis of race, sex, 
college, ethnicity or national origin." 
Lawyers challenging the measure say that 
because it became part of the state constitution, 
they were deprived of the equal chance to lobby 
for affirmative-action policies in the state 
Legislature or before university officials. They 
say they want a Supreme Court ruling that 
would also wipe out the nearly identical voter-
approved bans in California, Arizona, 
Washington, Nebraska and Oklahoma. 
In November, they won an 8-7 ruling by the 
Cincinnati-based 6th Circuit Court of Appeals, 
which declared unconstitutional Michigan's 
Proposition 2. It "undermines the Equal 
Protection Clause's guarantee that all citizens 
ought to have equal access to the tools of 
political change," said Judge R. Guy Cole Jr. His 
opinion spoke for all eight Democratic 
appointees to the appeals court, while the seven 
Republican appointees dissented. 
Michigan Atty. Gen. Bill Schuette appealed, and 
the court will hear arguments in the case of 
Schuette vs. Coalition to Defend Affirmative 
Action on Oct. 15. 
Harris' brief for California was also signed by 
Lisa Madigan of Illinois and four other attorneys 
general, though none have similar voter 
measures that turn on the outcome. Usually, a 
state's top attorneys intervene in pending 
Supreme Court cases to defend their state's laws. 
In this instance, however, the California attorney 
general is asking the justices to hand down a 
ruling that would void a provision in California's 
Constitution. 
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Last year, Harris also refused to defend 
California's Proposition 8 and its prohibition on 
same-sex marriage after it had been struck down 
by a judge in San Francisco. The Supreme Court 
in June, citing the state's refusal, said the private 
sponsors of the ballot measure did not have legal 
standing to defend it in court. 
Harris took office as attorney general in January 
2011. Her website describes her as "the first 
woman, the first African American and the first 
South Asian to hold the office in the history of 
California." 
Her friend-of-the-court brief read: "California 
has a particular interest in the outcome of this 
case because, as in Michigan, its voters amended 
its Constitution to add language virtually 
identical to the constitutional provision at issue 
in this case.... It is particularly important for 
states with large nonwhite populations to ensure 
that students of all races have meaningful access 
to their public colleges and universities." 
She lauded the "well-reasoned decision" of the 
6th Circuit and said the students and citizens 
should be free to press for "race-conscious 
admissions policies." 
Harris' brief for California was also signed by 
the top attorneys from five other states and the 
District of Columbia: Madigan of Illinois, David 
Louie of Hawaii, Thomas Miller of Iowa, Gary 
King of New Mexico, Ellen Rosenbaum of 
Oregon and Irvin Nathan from Washington, 
D.C. 
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“What’s Your Hurry?” 
The New York Times 
Linda Greenhouse 
June 12, 2013 
Every Supreme Court decision day that goes 
by without a ruling in the University of 
Texas affirmative action case provokes a 
generalized wringing of hands from those 
eager (or afraid) to learn the constitutional 
future of university admissions. “Where’s 
the case? What’s taking so long?” 
To which I say: what’s the rush? 
True, Fisher v. University of Texas was 
argued way back on Oct. 10, making it the 
oldest argued case on the court’s docket by 
more than six weeks. True, cases argued as 
recently as late April have already been 
decided, and it’s rare for June to arrive with 
an October case still hanging. 
So I’m as puzzled as the next person as to 
precisely why the eight justices participating 
in this case (Justice Elena Kagan is recused, 
due to her earlier work on the case as 
solicitor general) haven’t been able to 
produce a decision. But that’s not really my 
point. 
Rather, I’m questioning why the justices set 
out to decide this case in the first place. Why 
were they eager to get their hands around the 
issue so soon after suggesting, in the 2003 
decision that upheld race-conscious 
admission in the University of Michigan 
Law School, that the country and the court 
should let the matter rest for 25 years? Why 
would they pick a case destined to be 
decided by an eight-member court, a case 
afflicted with a major procedural obstacle — 
the disappointed white applicant has already 
received her college degree elsewhere, a fact 
that would seem to make the case moot, as 
an earlier, more restrained Supreme Court 
found 40 years ago when confronted with a 
similar situation in an affirmative action 
case it had undertaken to decide.    This is a 
court in a hurry. The justices made that 
strikingly clear back in March, when they 
accepted a case on the validity of a voter 
referendum in Michigan that barred 
affirmative action in public university 
admissions. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had declared 
the ban unconstitutional by a vote of 8 to 7. 
By the time the Supreme Court agreed on 
March 25 to hear the Michigan attorney 
general’s appeal, its calendar for the current 
term was full, so the case won’t be argued 
until after the new term begins in the fall. 
The new case, Schuette v. Coalition to 
Defend Affirmative Action, differs from the 
Texas case in presenting an oblique rather 
than direct attack on affirmative action. The 
question is whether by adding the anti-
affirmative action provision to the state 
constitution, the referendum altered the 
political process in a way that violates the 
federal constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection. This “political process” question, 
which the court has wrestled with for years, 
won’t be answered by what the court does in 
 132 
the Texas case. But it’s hard to imagine that 
the Texas decision won’t provide the lens 
through which to examine the issue in the 
Michigan case. 
When the justices receive a new appeal that 
raises questions in the general vicinity of a 
case they have already agreed to decide, 
their routine response is to place the new 
case on hold to see how things shake out. It 
was therefore surprising that rather than 
deferring action on the Michigan case, the 
court grabbed it. 
One reason might be that Justice Anthony 
M. Kennedy, who almost certainly received 
the opinion assignment in the Texas case, 
isn’t going far enough in that case to satisfy 
the other conservative justices. Under this 
theory, those justices responded to what they 
saw as a frustratingly narrow Kennedy 
opinion by jumping aboard the Michigan 
case as the next potential vehicle for 
shutting down affirmative action. They 
might have waited — traditionally, they 
would have waited — but, as I said, it’s a 
court in a hurry. 
The question is why. The answer, I believe, 
can be found in the faint but resonant 
drumbeat of conservative concern about the 
stability of the Roberts Court’s narrow 
conservative majority. Most uninformed 
commentary on the future of the Supreme 
Court — which is to say, most commentary 
— has focused on Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, who just passed her 80th birthday. 
Is she about to retire, everyone asks, to 
permit President Obama to name her 
replacement? (The answer is no, she’s 
healthy and loves her job.) 
This near-obsession with Justice Ginsburg’s 
age, health and plans has obscured the fact 
that the conservative justices are growing 
old at exactly the same rate. Justice Antonin 
Scalia turned 77 in March. Justice Kennedy 
turns 77 next month. Even Justice Clarence 
Thomas, a mere 43 when he was named to 
the court 22 years ago, becomes eligible on 
June 23 for his Medicare card. 
Curt Levey, a prominent conservative 
commentator, took the occasion of Justice 
Scalia’s birthday to observe, in a Fox News 
op-ed, that it was entirely likely that at least 
one of the five conservative justices would 
leave the bench during the remainder of the 
Obama presidency. The result, he warned 
apocalyptically, was “a Warren Court 
redux,” one that would erase “all the strides 
conservatives have made since the Reagan 
era in containing judicial activism.” 
Mr. Levey, a Harvard Law School graduate, 
heads an organization called the Committee 
for Justice, devoted to blocking Obama 
administration judicial nominations. His 
account of exactly what the court under 
Chief Justice Earl Warren can be blamed for 
left a bit to be desired. “The Warren Court 
brought us Roe v. Wade,” he asserted. In 
fact, it was the Supreme Court under Chief 
Justice Warren E. Burger that issued the 
1973 abortion decision, with a 7-to-2 
majority opinion joined by three of President 
Richard M. Nixon’s four appointees, 
including the chief justice. 
Well, the details matter less, anyway, than 
the overall theme, which is: be afraid, be 
very afraid. Or to put it another way, in the 
words of the old Janis Joplin song: get it 
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while you can. This is as good as it’s going 
to get. 
That impulse may also explain the court’s 
otherwise mysterious decision a few weeks 
ago to grant review in a new church-state 
case, Town of Greece v. Galloway. The 
western New York town is appealing a 
federal appeals court’s decision that its 
practice of opening town board meetings 
with a prayer violates the Establishment 
Clause. 
The problem that the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit found was 
not the notion of prayer as such (the 
Supreme Court upheld the concept of 
legislative prayer 30 years ago but the fact 
that nearly all the prayers offered at the 
board meetings were Christian, with most 
containing explicit references to Jesus 
and/or Christian theology. That pattern, the 
appeals court said, meant that “the town’s 
prayer practice must be viewed as an 
endorsement of a particular religious 
viewpoint.” Other federal courts confronted 
with similar facts have ruled the same way. 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has been 
able to find near-unanimity in religion cases 
only by deciding the cases on the narrowest 
possible grounds. So what would motivate 
the justices to reach for this little case, with 
its facts that are surely inauspicious for 
those who want to elevate the role of 
religion in the public square? I suppose the 
answer is: there’s nothing to lose, and if we 
don’t go for it now, it may only get harder in 
the years ahead. 
Get it while you can — or even if you can’t. 
We’ll see soon enough. 
 
 
  
 134 
Madigan v. Levin 
12-872 
Ruling Below: Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2012), cert granted, 133 S.Ct. 1600 
(2013). 
Harvey N. Levin worked as an Illinois Assistant Attorney General from September 5, 2000, until 
his termination on May 12, 2006. Levin was over the age of sixty at the time of his termination 
and believes he was fired because of his age and gender. Levin filed suit against the State of 
Illinois, the Office of the Illinois Attorney General, Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan, in 
her individual and official capacities, and four additional Attorney General employees in their 
individual capacities. He asserts claims for relief under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment via 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The individual-capacity 
defendants argued at the district court that they were entitled to qualified immunity with respect 
to Levin's § 1983 age discrimination claim. Specifically, they argued that Levin's § 1983 claim is 
precluded by the ADEA because the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age discrimination 
claims. The district court disagreed and denied qualified immunity.  The Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit held that the court had jurisdiction to decide whether the ADEA precluded a § 
1983 equal protection claim; resolving a matter of first impression in the Circuit, the ADEA does 
not preclude a § 1983 claim for enforcement of constitutional rights; and individual defendants 
were not entitled to qualified immunity. 
Question Presented: Whether the Seventh Circuit erred in holding, in an acknowledged 
departure from the rule in at least four other circuits, that state and local government employees 
may avoid the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act’s comprehensive remedial regime 
by bringing age discrimination claims directly under the Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. 
 
 
Harvey N. LEVIN, Plaintiff–Appellee, 
v. 
Lisa MADIGAN, in her individual capacity, Ann Spillane, Alan Rosen, Roger Flahaven, 
and Deborah Hagan, Defendants–Appellants, 
and 
Lisa Madigan, in her official capacity as Attorney General of Illinois, Office of the Illinois 
Attorney General, and State of Illinois, Defendants. 
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Decided on August 17, 2012 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
KANNE, Circuit Judge 
Harvey N. Levin worked as an Illinois 
Assistant Attorney General from September 
5, 2000, until his termination on May 12, 
2006. Levin was over the age of sixty at the 
time of his termination and believes he was 
fired because of his age and gender. 
Accordingly, Levin filed suit against the 
State of Illinois, the Office of the Illinois 
Attorney General, Illinois Attorney General 
Lisa Madigan, in her individual and official 
capacities, and four additional Attorney 
General employees in their individual 
capacities. He asserts claims for relief under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, and the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment via 42 U.S.C. § 
1983. The individual-capacity defendants 
argued at the district court that they were 
entitled to qualified immunity with respect 
to Levin's § 1983 age discrimination claim. 
Specifically, they argued that Levin's § 
1983 claim is precluded by the ADEA 
because the ADEA is the exclusive remedy 
for age discrimination claims. The district 
court disagreed and denied qualified 
immunity. The case is now before us on 
interlocutory appeal, and for the following 
reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Levin was fifty-five years old when he was 
hired as an Assistant Attorney General in the 
Office of the Illinois Attorney General's 
Consumer Fraud Bureau on September 5, 
2000. On December 1, 2002, Levin was 
promoted to Senior Assistant Attorney 
General and retained this title until he was 
terminated on May 12, 2006. Levin was 
evaluated on an annual basis and his 
performance reviews indicate that he 
consistently met or exceeded his employer's 
expectations in twelve job categories. The 
Illinois Attorney General's Office asserts, 
however, that Levin's low productivity, 
excessive socializing, inferior litigation 
skills, and poor judgment led to his 
termination. Although not addressed in 
Levin's evaluations, these issues were 
discussed among Levin's supervisors and 
brought to Levin's attention. 
Levin was one of twelve attorneys fired in 
May 2006. After he was terminated, Levin 
was replaced by a female attorney in her 
thirties. Two other male attorneys from the 
Consumer Fraud Bureau, both over the age 
of forty, were also terminated and replaced 
by younger attorneys, one male and one 
female. The Illinois Attorney General's 
Office disputes that these new hires 
“replaced” the terminated attorneys because 
the younger attorneys were not assigned the 
three former attorneys' cases. 
Levin filed his complaint in the Northern 
District of Illinois on August 23, 2007, 
asserting claims of age and sex 
discrimination under the ADEA, Title VII, 
and the Equal Protection Clause via 42 
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U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants in this suit 
are divided into two groups for litigation 
purposes: (1) Lisa Madigan, in her official 
capacity as the Illinois Attorney General, the 
Office of the Illinois Attorney General, and 
the State of Illinois (the “Entity 
Defendants”), and (2) Lisa Madigan as an 
individual, Ann Spillane, Alan Rosen, Roger 
Flahavan, and Deborah Hagan (the 
“Individual Defendants”). Only the 
Individual Defendants have appealed to this 
court. 
On November 26, 2007, the Entity 
Defendants and the Individual Defendants 
filed separate motions to dismiss Levin's 
complaint in its entirety. On December 12, 
2007, the district court stayed discovery, 
requiring Levin to respond to the Entity 
Defendants's motion as to whether he was an 
“employee” for purposes of the ADEA and 
Title VII. On September 12, 2008, the 
district court held that Levin was an 
“employee” and lifted the stay on discovery. 
The Entity Defendants filed a second motion 
to dismiss shortly thereafter. Following 
discovery, the Entity Defendants and the 
Individual Defendants filed separate motions 
for summary judgment on November 13, 
2009. 
The district court ruled on the five pending 
motions in two separate opinions, both of 
which are pertinent to the issues before this 
court. In the first opinion, decided March 10, 
2010, the Honorable David H. Coar 
addressed the three pending motions to 
dismiss. Levin I. Relevant to this appeal, 
Judge Coar granted the Individual 
Defendants' motion to dismiss Levin's § 
1983 equal protection claim for age 
discrimination.  In that motion, the 
Individual Defendants asserted that the § 
1983 claim was either precluded by the 
ADEA or they were entitled to qualified 
immunity. After acknowledging that the 
Seventh Circuit has yet to address ADEA 
exclusivity, Judge Coar held that the ADEA 
does not foreclose Levin's § 1983 equal 
protection claim.  But Judge Coar granted 
qualified immunity for the Individual 
Defendants because the availability of such 
a claim was not clearly established at the 
time Levin was terminated.  
On January 7, 2011, Levin's case was 
reassigned to the Honorable Edmond E. 
Chang. Judge Chang issued an opinion on 
July 12, 2011, granting in part and denying 
in part the two pending motions for 
summary judgment.  Levin II. Judge Chang 
did not disturb Judge Coar's ruling that the 
ADEA is not the exclusive remedy for age 
discrimination claims.  He did, however, 
reverse two of Judge Coar's prior rulings, in 
light of additional briefing. First, Judge 
Chang determined that Levin is not an 
“employee” for purposes of Title VII and 
the ADEA, thus foreclosing any claim Levin 
could bring under those statutes.  Second, 
Judge Chang held that the Individual 
Defendants were not entitled to qualified 
immunity on Levin's § 1983 claim for age 
discrimination.  Rejecting Judge Coar's 
reasoning, Judge Chang noted that “[w]hen 
determining whether qualified immunity 
applies to protect a defendant, the question 
is whether a reasonable official would have 
known that the official was violating a 
clearly established constitutional right, 
which is a substantive question, not a 
question concerning whether a particular 
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procedural vehicle (i.e., cause of action) is 
available.” Because it is clearly established 
that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids 
arbitrary age discrimination,  Judge Chang 
held that qualified immunity did not apply 
and Levin had established a genuine issue of 
material fact such that his § 1983 age 
discrimination claim could proceed to 
trial.  The Individual Defendants filed this 
timely appeal, asking this court to find that 
they are entitled to qualified immunity 
because the ADEA is the exclusive remedy 
for Levin's age discrimination claims. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Appellate Jurisdiction 
Levin does not dispute that we have 
jurisdiction over an order denying qualified 
immunity under the collateral 
order doctrine.  But Levin believes this court 
lacks jurisdiction over the issue of whether 
the ADEA precludes a § 1983 equal 
protection claim. Levin asserts that this 
issue, resolved in Judge Coar's opinion, is 
not inextricably intertwined with Judge 
Chang's denial of qualified immunity.  
We disagree with Levin's analysis. Instead, 
we believe this case is analogous to Wilkie v. 
Robbins. In Wilkie, on an interlocutory 
appeal of the denial of qualified immunity, 
the Supreme Court considered whether a 
new, freestanding damages remedy should 
exist under Bivens.  The Supreme Court held 
that it had jurisdiction to consider whether 
such a remedy existed because the 
recognition of an entire cause of action is 
“directly implicated by the defense of 
qualified immunity.”  Similar to Wilkie, the 
very existence of a freestanding damages 
remedy under § 1983 is directly implicated 
by a qualified immunity defense such that 
we have jurisdiction over this appeal. Thus, 
we first consider whether the ADEA 
precludes a § 1983 equal protection claim 
before we turn to the issue of qualified 
immunity. 
B. General Preclusion of § 1983 Claims 
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 
codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “authorizes 
suits to enforce individual rights under 
federal statutes as well as the Constitution” 
against state and local government 
officials.  Section 1983 does not create 
substantive rights, but operates as “a means 
for vindicating federal rights conferred 
elsewhere.”  
In evaluating the limits of relief available 
under § 1983 for statutory claims, the 
Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen the 
remedial devices provided in a particular 
Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they 
may suffice to demonstrate congressional 
intent to preclude the remedy of suits 
under § 1983.” In Sea Clammers, the 
Supreme Court held that a suit for damages 
under the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act (“FWPCA”) or Marine Protection, 
Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 
(“MPRSA”) could not be brought pursuant 
to § 1983because both Acts “provide quite 
comprehensive enforcement 
mechanisms.”  These mechanisms include 
citizen-suit provisions, which allow private 
citizens to sue for prospective relief, and 
notice provisions requiring such plaintiffs to 
notify the EPA, the State, and the alleged 
violator before filing suit.   
 138 
Over two decades after Sea Clammers, the 
Supreme Court again rejected a plaintiff's 
attempt to seek damages under § 1983 for 
violation of a statute which provided its 
own, more restrictive judicial 
remedy.  In Rancho Palos Verdes, the 
plaintiff filed suit for  injunctive relief under 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
(“TCA”) and sought damages and attorney's 
fees under § 1983 after a city planning 
committee denied his request for a 
conditional-use permit for an antenna tower 
on his property.  The TCA “imposes specific 
limitations on the traditional authority of 
state and local governments to regulate the 
location, construction, and modification of 
[wireless communications] 
facilities.”  When a permit is requested and 
denied, the TCA requires local governments 
to provide a written decision, supported by 
substantial evidence, within a reasonable 
period of time.  An individual may seek 
judicial review within thirty days of this 
decision, and the court is required to hear 
and decide the case on an expedited 
basis. Further, a plaintiff may not be entitled 
to compensatory damages and cannot 
recover attorney's fees and costs.   
In discerning congressional intent, the Court 
held that “[t]he provision of an express, 
private means of redress in the statute itself 
is ordinarily an indication that Congress did 
not intend to leave open a more expansive 
remedy under § 1983.”  Conversely, the 
Court noted that “in all of the cases in which 
we have held that § 1983 is available for 
violation of a federal statute, we have 
emphasized that the statute at issue ... did 
not provide a private judicial remedy ... for 
the rights violated.” Because the TCA's 
provisions limit the relief available to 
private individuals and provide for 
expedited judicial review, the Court held 
that the TCA precludes relief under § 1983.   
While the plaintiffs in Sea 
Clammers and Rancho Palos Verdes sought 
to assert federal statutory rights under § 
1983, two other Supreme Court cases have 
examined whether a plaintiff is precluded 
from asserting constitutional rights under § 
1983 when a remedial statutory scheme also 
exists. In Smith v. Robinson, the Supreme 
Court held that Congress intended the 
Education of the Handicapped Act (“EHA”),  
“to be the exclusive avenue through which a 
plaintiff may assert an equal protection 
claim to a publicly financed special 
education.”  The EHA was designed to “aid 
the States in complying with their 
constitutional obligations to provide public 
education for handicapped children.”  The 
Act established “an enforceable substantive 
right to a free appropriate public education” 
and “an elaborate procedural mechanism to 
protect the rights of handicapped 
children.”  Under the EHA, plaintiffs were 
entitled to a fair and adequate state hearing, 
detailed procedural safeguards, and judicial 
review.  Relying on the comprehensive 
statutory scheme and legislative history, the 
Supreme Court held that Congress did not 
intend to allow a handicapped child to 
bypass the EHA and go directly to court 
with a § 1983 equal protection claim as 
“such a result [would] render superfluous 
most of the detailed procedural protections 
in the statute.”   
In Preiser v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court 
considered whether state prisoners deprived 
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of good-time credits could pursue their 
claims for equitable relief under § 1983 or if 
such a remedy was unavailable because of 
the habeas corpus statutes. The Supreme 
Court discussed the history of habeas corpus 
and recognized that “over the years, the writ 
of habeas corpus evolved as a remedy 
available to effect discharge from any 
confinement contrary to the Constitution or 
fundamental law.”  Procedurally, the writ 
requires a prisoner to exhaust his adequate 
state remedies prior to seeking federal 
judicial relief.  The Court held that Congress 
intended habeas corpus to be the sole 
remedy, as “[i]t would wholly frustrate 
explicit congressional intent to hold that the 
respondents in the present case could evade 
this requirement by the simple expedient of 
putting a different label on their pleadings.”   
Although we have highlighted the four 
opinions in Sea Clammers, Rancho Palos 
Verdes, Smith, and Preiser, each of which 
found a § 1983 claim precluded, the 
Supreme Court does not “lightly conclude 
that Congress intended to preclude reliance 
on § 1983 as a remedy” for the deprivation 
of a federal right.  In fact, the Court has 
rejected § 1983preclusion arguments in 
several other cases.  
Most recently, the Supreme Court 
considered whether Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1681(a), precludes a § 1983 equal 
protection claim.  The Court first 
acknowledged the importance of discerning 
congressional intent and summarized its 
prior rulings, stating: 
In cases in which the § 1983 claim 
alleges a constitutional violation, lack of 
congressional intent may be inferred 
from a comparison of the rights and 
protections of the statute and those 
existing under the Constitution. Where 
the contours of such rights and 
protections diverge in significant ways, 
it is not likely that Congress intended to 
displace § 1983suits enforcing 
constitutional rights. Our conclusions 
regarding congressional intent can be 
confirmed by a statute's context. 
The Court also recognized that, in its prior 
opinions finding preclusion, the statutes at 
issue required plaintiffs to exhaust their 
administrative remedies or comply with 
other procedural requirements before filing 
suit.  “Offering plaintiffs a direct route to 
court via § 1983 would have circumvented 
these procedures and given plaintiffs access 
to tangible benefits—such as damages, 
attorney's fees, and costs—that were 
unavailable under the statutes.”   
Turning to the statute before it, the Supreme 
Court examined Title IX's remedial scheme 
and determined that Title IX does not 
preclude a § 1983 equal protection claim. 
Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of gender in educational programs that 
receive federal financial assistance. Two 
enforcement mechanisms exist: (1) “an 
administrative procedure resulting in the 
withdrawal of federal funding from 
institutions that are not in compliance” and 
(2) an implied private right of action, 
through which a plaintiff may seek 
injunctive relief and recover damages.  A 
plaintiff suing under Title IX is not required 
to exhaust any administrative remedies or 
provide notice before filing suit; instead, 
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“plaintiffs can file directly in court and can 
obtain the full range of remedies.”  Further, 
Congress failed to include an express private 
right remedy, and the Court “has never held 
that an implied right of action had the effect 
of precluding suit under § 1983, likely 
because of the difficulty of discerning 
congressional intent in such a situation.”   
The Court also emphasized the differences 
between the protections guaranteed by Title 
IX and the Equal Protection Clause. First, 
Title IX permits a plaintiff to sue institutions 
and programs receiving federal funding, but 
does not authorize suit against school 
officials, teachers, or other individuals.  In 
contrast, § 1983 equal protection claims 
reach state actors, including individuals, 
municipalities, and other state entities. 
Second, some policies that are exempted 
under Title IX could still be subject to 
claims under the Equal Protection Clause. 
Finally, the Court noted that “the standards 
for establishing liability may not be wholly 
congruent.” For example, a Title IX plaintiff 
may only have to show that a school 
administrator acted with deliberate 
indifference while a § 1983 plaintiff must 
demonstrate the existence of a municipal 
custom, policy, or practice. Because of these 
differences and the absence of a 
comprehensive remedial scheme, the 
plaintiffs' § 1983 equal protection claim was 
not precluded. 
We conclude from these cases that, in 
determining whether a § 1983 equal 
protection claim is precluded by a statutory 
scheme, the most important consideration is 
congressional intent. Congressional intent 
may be construed from the language of the 
statute and legislative history, the statute's 
context, the nature and extent of the 
remedial scheme, and a comparison of the 
rights and protections afforded by the 
statutory scheme versus a § 1983 claim. A 
statutory scheme may preclude a § 
1983 constitutional claim, especially if a § 
1983 claim circumvents the statute's 
carefully tailored scheme and provides 
access to benefits unavailable under that 
scheme. Keeping these concepts in mind, we 
now turn to the issue before us: whether the 
ADEA precludes a § 1983 equal protection 
claim. 
C. ADEA Preclusion of § 1983 Claims 
Congress enacted the ADEA “to promote 
employment of older persons based on their 
ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary 
age discrimination in employment; [and] to 
help employers and workers find ways of 
meeting problems arising from the impact of 
age on employment.”  The ADEA makes it 
unlawful for an employer to “to fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual 
or otherwise discriminate against any 
individual ... because of such individual's 
age.”  In general, the ADEA provides 
coverage for private, state, and federal 
employees who are forty years of age and 
older, albeit with a few notable 
exceptions.  The Act “incorporates some 
features of both Title VII and the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938 [FLSA], which has 
led [the Supreme Court] to describe it as 
‘something of a hybrid.’ ”  Specifically, the 
substantive provisions of the ADEA are 
modeled after Title VII, while its remedial 
provisions incorporate provisions of the 
FLSA.   
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The ADEA expressly grants individual 
employees a private right of action.  An 
ADEA plaintiff must first file a charge with 
the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), generally within 180 
days of the unlawful age 
discrimination.  The EEOC then notifies all 
parties involved and, if the EEOC believes 
there has been a violation, the agency 
“promptly seek[s] to eliminate any alleged 
unlawful practice by informal methods of 
conciliation, conference, and persuasion.”  If 
the EEOC charge is dismissed or terminated, 
the EEOC is required to notify the plaintiff.   
Sixty days after filing an EEOC charge, a 
plaintiff is entitled to file a civil lawsuit and, 
if he seeks damages, receive a trial by jury. 
This right terminates, however, if the EEOC 
files its own lawsuit to enforce the plaintiff's 
claim.  “When confronted with a  violation 
of the ADEA, a district court is authorized 
to afford relief by means of reinstatement, 
backpay, injunctive relief, declaratory 
judgment, and attorney's fees.”  If a 
violation was willful, a plaintiff may recover 
liquidated damages. “The Act also gives 
federal courts the discretion to ‘grant such 
legal or equitable relief as may be 
appropriate to effectuate the purposes of [the 
Act].’ ”  
Whether the ADEA precludes a § 
1983 equal protection claim is a matter of 
first impression in the Seventh Circuit. All 
other circuit courts to consider the issue 
have held that the ADEA is the exclusive 
remedy for age discrimination claims, 
largely relying on the Fourth Circuit's 
reasoning in Zombro v. Baltimore City 
Police Department.  District courts located 
in other circuits, however, are split on the 
issue.  In the present case, two district court 
judges from the Northern District of Illinois 
held that the ADEA does not preclude a § 
1983 equal protection claim.  
In Zombro, the Fourth Circuit held that 
allowing a plaintiff to seek recovery for age 
discrimination through a § 1983 equal 
protection claim would undermine the 
comprehensive remedial scheme set forth in 
the ADEA.  Citing the ADEA's provisions 
requiring notice to the EEOC, informal 
conciliation, and termination of a plaintiff's 
action upon the filing of a complaint by the 
EEOC, the court believed that if a plaintiff 
could pursue a § 1983 action instead, “[t]he 
plaintiff would have direct and immediate 
access to the federal courts, the 
comprehensive administrative process 
would be bypassed, and the goal of 
compliance through mediation would be 
discarded.”  Where Congress has enacted a 
comprehensive statutory scheme, such as the 
ADEA, the Fourth Circuit holds that 
preclusion of § 1983 suits is appropriate 
“unless the legislative history of the 
comprehensive statutory scheme in question 
manifests a congressional intent to allow an 
individual to pursue independently rights 
under both the comprehensive statutory 
scheme and other applicable state and 
federal statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.”  The Fourth Circuit found no such 
intent in the language and history of the 
ADEA.  That court also relied upon the 
ADEA's adoption of Section 216 of the 
FLSA, which has been held to be “the sole 
remedy available to the employee for 
enforcement of whatever rights he may have 
under the FLSA.”  To the court, this shared 
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provision, along with the ADEA's precisely 
drawn statutory scheme, evidenced 
congressional intent that the ADEA be the 
exclusive remedy for age discrimination 
suits.   
Several circuit courts addressing ADEA 
preclusion have simply relied 
on Zombro's holding.  But not all district 
court judges are convinced. The leading 
district court case rejecting ADEA 
preclusion of § 1983 equal protection claims 
is Mummelthie v. City of Mason City, Iowa. 
In that case, Judge Bennett sharply criticized 
the Fourth Circuit's analysis 
in Zombro, noting that the court failed to 
consider the statutory language and 
legislative history of the ADEA, as well as 
its similarities to Title VII, a statutory 
scheme which does not preclude § 
1983claims.  
Given the conflicting case law, further 
review of this issue is required. Although the 
ADEA enacts a comprehensive statutory 
scheme for enforcement of its own statutory 
rights, akin to Sea Clammers and Rancho 
Palos Verdes, we find that it does not 
preclude a § 1983 claim for constitutional 
rights. While admittedly a close call, 
especially in light of the conflicting 
decisions from our sister circuits, we base 
our holding on the ADEA's lack of 
legislative history or statutory language 
precluding constitutional claims, and the 
divergent rights and protections afforded by 
the ADEA as compared to a § 1983 equal 
protection claim.  
1. Statutory Text and Legislative History 
Nothing in the text of the ADEA expressly 
precludes a § 1983 claim or addresses 
constitutional rights.  Nor does the 
legislative history provide clear guidance on 
this issue. Although the Zombro court 
interpreted this lack of explicit language or 
legislative history as congressional intent 
not to allow individuals to pursue 
constitutional rights outside of the ADEA's 
scheme,  we reach the opposite conclusion. 
Congress's silence on the issue tells us 
nothing about preclusion—we do not know 
whether Congress even considered 
alternative constitutional remedies in 
enacting the ADEA. 
We agree with the Zombro majority that the 
ADEA sets forth a rather comprehensive 
remedial scheme. The ADEA provides a 
private right of action, requires notice and 
exhaustion of remedies, and limits the 
damages available under the Act.  Like Sea 
Clammers and Rancho Palos Verdes, this 
scheme speaks volumes as to how Congress 
intended allegations of statutory age 
discrimination to proceed. 
But, as to constitutional claims, we do not 
believe Congress's intent is as apparent as 
other circuit courts have found. As noted in 
Mummelthie, “the ADEA does not purport 
to provide a remedy for violation of federal 
constitutional rights” and no express 
language indicates that Congress intended to 
foreclose relief under § 1983 for 
constitutional violations.  Beyond that, we 
have a hard time concluding that Congress's 
mere creation of a statutory scheme for age 
discrimination claims was intended to 
foreclose preexisting constitutional claims. 
Congress frequently enacts new legal 
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remedies that are not intended to repeal their 
predecessors.  Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court has emphasized on several occasions 
that “repeals by implication are not favored 
and will not be presumed unless the 
intention of the legislature to repeal is clear 
and manifest.”  
What, then, do we make of the Supreme 
Court's holdings in Smith and Preiser, which 
held that constitutional claims were barred 
by the existence of comprehensive statutory 
schemes? In both of those cases, the statutes 
at issue were specifically designed to 
address constitutional issues. For instance, 
the habeas corpus statutes in Preiser provide 
a remedy for prisoners “in custody in 
violation of the Constitution or laws or 
treaties of the United States. Similarly, 
the Smith court acknowledged that “[t]he 
EHA is a comprehensive scheme set up by 
Congress to aid the States in complying 
with their constitutional obligations to 
provide public education for handicapped 
children.”  The statute itself provides that 
federal intervention is necessary to “ensure 
equal protection of the law.”  This goal is 
also referenced in the legislative history, as 
recognized in Smith.  These references 
demonstrate that Congress considered 
alternative constitutional remedies in 
enacting the EHA. 
The ADEA is readily distinguishable. “In 
contrast to the statutes at issue 
in Preiser and in Smith, the ADEA does not 
purport to provide a remedy for violation of 
constitutional rights. Instead, it provides a 
mechanism to enforce only the substantive 
rights created by the ADEA itself.”  For the 
preclusion of constitutional claims, we 
believe more is required than a 
comprehensive statutory scheme. This 
notion is supported by the Supreme Court's 
references in Smith to the legislative history 
of the EHA.  Thus, in Smith, it was more 
than just the comprehensive remedial 
scheme that convinced the Court that the 
EHA is an exclusive remedy. In this 
way, Smith differs from Sea 
Clammers and Rancho Palos Verdes, cases 
tasked only with determining whether § 
1983 statutory claims were precluded by that 
statute's own comprehensive scheme. In 
sum, even though the ADEA is a 
comprehensive remedial scheme, without 
some additional indication of congressional 
intent, we cannot say that the ADEA's 
scheme alone is enough to preclude § 1983 
constitutional claims. 
The Ninth Circuit's 
recent Ahlmeyer decision raises one 
additional point on this issue that 
necessitates discussion, as the court relied 
upon our prior precedent. As background, 
because age is not a suspect classification, 
an equal protection claim of age 
discrimination in employment is subject 
only to rational basis review, in which the 
age classification must be rationally related 
to a legitimate state interest.  In contrast, the 
ADEA “prohibits substantially more state 
employment decisions and practices than 
would likely be held unconstitutional under 
the applicable equal protection, rational 
basis standard.” Thus, the Ahlmeyer decision 
notes in its opinion that “[b]ecause the 
ADEA provides broader protection than the 
Constitution, a plaintiff has ‘nothing 
substantive to gain’ by also asserting a § 
1983 claim.”  
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In Williams, we briefly discussed the 
plaintiffs' failure to differentiate their Title 
VI and equal protection claims.  Citing Sea 
Clammers, we noted that “[w]hen Congress 
enacts a comprehensive scheme for 
enforcing a statutory right that is identical to 
a right enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
... the section 1983 lawsuit must be litigated 
in accordance with the scheme.”  We then 
recognized that, according to the Supreme 
Court, Title VI proscribes only those racial 
classifications that violate the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Thus, there was nothing 
to gain by asserting an equal protection 
claim, and failure to comply with Title VI's 
procedural requirements would have left the 
plaintiffs without a remedy. But again, 
like Smith, Title VI's legislative history 
provides insight into Congress's intent.  In 
light of this clear congressional intent, 
Williams (like Smith ) is also distinguishable 
from the ADEA. And while we freely 
acknowledge that the ADEA's heightened 
scrutiny provides a stronger mechanism for 
plaintiffs to challenge age discrimination in 
employment, absent any additional 
indication from Congress, we simply cannot 
infer that Congress intended to do away with 
a § 1983 constitutional alternative.  
Finally, the circuit courts rely upon 
Congress's incorporation of the FLSA's 
remedial scheme in finding that Congress 
intended to preclude a § 1983 constitutional 
remedy.  This is a perplexing argument 
because the cases which have found the 
FLSA to be an exclusive remedy do not 
(and, in fact, cannot) address constitutional 
claims.  Unlike Title VII and the ADEA, the 
rights created by the FLSA are not based on 
rights also guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Thus, cases addressing FLSA exclusivity 
speak little to the issue presently before this 
court. We have no quarrel with the notion 
that the FLSA is the sole remedy for the 
enforcement of FLSA rights and, similarly, 
the ADEA is the sole remedy for the 
enforcement of ADEA rights. Even the 
district courts that believe the ADEA does 
not preclude § 1983 constitutional claims 
agree on this point.  Because the FLSA lacks 
a constitutional counterpart, it provides little 
additional guidance beyond the statutory 
text.  
2. Comparison of Rights and Protections 
Given the absence of any clear or manifest 
congressional intent in either the language of 
the statute or the legislative history, 
Fitzgerald directs us to compare the rights 
and protections afforded by the statute and 
the Constitution. We believe the rights and 
protections afforded by the ADEA and § 
1983 equal protection claims diverge in a 
few significant ways. 
First, an ADEA plaintiff may only sue his 
employer, an employment agency, or a labor 
organization.  In contrast, a § 1983 plaintiff 
may file suit against an individual, so long 
as that individual caused or participated in 
the alleged deprivation of the plaintiff's 
constitutional rights.  A § 1983 plaintiff may 
also sue a governmental organization, but 
only if he can demonstrate that the alleged 
constitutional violation was “caused by (1) 
an express municipal policy; (2) a 
widespread, though unwritten, custom or 
practice; or (3) a decision by a municipal 
agent with final policymaking 
authority.”  These divergent rights between 
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the ADEA and a § 1983 constitutional claim 
seriously affect a plaintiff's choice of 
defendants and his strategy for presenting a 
prima facie case. 
Second, the ADEA expressly limits or 
exempts claims by certain individuals, 
including elected officials and certain 
members of their staff, appointees, law 
enforcement officers, and firefighters.  The 
statutory scheme also prohibits claims by 
employees under the age of forty or those 
bringing so-called “reverse age 
discrimination” claims.  There are no such 
limitations for § 1983 equal protection 
claims. 
Finally, as a practical matter in light of the 
Supreme Court's decision in Kimel, state 
employees suing under the ADEA are left 
without a damages remedy, as such claims 
are barred by Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity. In contrast, 
“[m]unicipalities do not enjoy any kind of 
immunity from suits for damages under § 
1983.” Without the availability of a § 
1983 claim, a state employee (like Levin) 
who suffers age discrimination in the course 
of his employment is left without a federal 
damages remedy.  
In light of our analysis of the ADEA and the 
relevant case law, and given these divergent 
rights and protections, we conclude that the 
ADEA is not the exclusive remedy for age 
discrimination in employment claims. 
D. Qualified Immunity 
Because the ADEA does not preclude 
Levin's § 1983 equal protection claim, we 
now turn to the issue of qualified immunity. 
We review a district court's denial of 
summary judgment based on qualified 
immunity de novo. To determine whether 
state actors are entitled to qualified 
immunity, we consider “(1) whether the 
facts, taken in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiffs, show that the defendants violated 
a constitutional right; and (2) whether that 
constitutional right was clearly established 
at the time of the alleged 
violation.”  Beyond asserting that the ADEA 
precludes a § 1983 claim, the Individual 
Defendants do not challenge the first prong 
on appeal. Thus, for our purposes, we need 
only briefly discuss the second prong of the 
qualified immunity analysis. 
 “A right is clearly established when, at the 
time of the challenged conduct, the contours 
of a right are sufficiently clear that every 
reasonable official would have understood 
that what he is doing violates that right.” 
Judge Coar's opinion granted qualified 
immunity as to Levin's § 1983 equal 
protection claim, finding that “whether the 
Seventh Circuit permits equal protection 
claims for age discrimination in light of the 
ADEA is unclear.” Accordingly, Judge Coar 
believed that the constitutional right was not 
clearly established and qualified immunity 
was appropriate.  On reconsideration, Judge 
Chang reversed Judge Coar's ruling, noting 
that “irrational age discrimination is clearly 
forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause” 
and the issue of qualified immunity is “not a 
question concerning whether a particular 
procedural vehicle (i.e., cause of action) is 
available.”  
We agree with Judge Chang. At the time of 
the alleged wrongdoing, it was clearly 
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established that age discrimination in 
employment violates the Equal Protection 
Clause.  Although age is not a suspect 
classification, states may not discriminate on 
that basis if such discrimination is not 
“rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest.”  Whether or not the ADEA is the 
exclusive remedy for plaintiffs suffering age 
discrimination in employment is irrelevant, 
and as Judge Chang noted, it is “odd to 
apply qualified immunity in the context 
where the procedural uncertainty arises from 
the fact that Congress created a statutory 
remedy for age discrimination that is 
substantively broader than the equal 
protection clause.” Because Levin's 
constitutional right was clearly established, 
the Individual Defendants are not entitled to 
qualified immunity. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the 
judgment of the district court. 
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“U.S. Supreme Court to Consider Application of ADEA to State and Local 
Workers” 
Lexology 
Jennifer Cerven 
April 2, 2013 
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear 
an appeal from Illinois Attorney General 
Lisa Madigan on the issue of whether state 
and local government employees can bypass 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
and sue for age discrimination under an 
equal protection theory. The case 
is Madigan v. Levin, Docket Number 12-
872. 
Appellate courts are split on whether the 
ADEA is the exclusive route for state and 
local government employees to bring a 
claim for age discrimination, or whether an 
equal protection claim via Section 1983 is 
available. The Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals decided that the Plaintiff, a former 
Assistant Attorney General, could go 
forward with a Section 1983 age 
discrimination claim against certain 
defendants (including Madigan) in their 
individual capacity.  The Seventh Circuit 
decided that the ADEA does not preclude a 
Section 1983 claim, but acknowledged that 
its decision was contrary to rulings in other 
circuits holding that the ADEA is the 
exclusive remedy for age discrimination 
claims.  
The question presented to the Supreme 
Court is whether the Seventh Circuit erred in 
holding that state and local government 
employees may avoid the ADEA’s remedial 
regime by bringing age discrimination 
claims under the Constitution’s Equal 
Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. 1`983. 
In the petitioner’s brief asking the Supreme 
Court to grant certiorari, Madigan noted the 
circuit split and argued that if the Seventh 
Circuit’s ruling were to stand, there would 
be about one million state and local workers 
in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin who 
would be able to bypass the ADEA’s 
administrative dispute resolution process at 
the EEOC and go straight to court.  Madigan 
argued that this would undercut the ADEA 
and would deprive state and local 
governments of prompt notice of claims. 
The outcome of the case will be important 
not only for state and municipal employers, 
but also for individual employees.  As a 
practical matter, the plaintiff could end up 
with no further opportunity for an age 
discrimination claim if the Supreme Court 
decides that the ADEA forecloses age 
claims under Section 1983.  That is because 
the lower court decided that the employee 
fell under the ADEA exclusion of policy-
making level employees, 29 U.S.C. 
§630(f).  Moreover, sovereign immunity 
applies to protect states from individual suits 
for monetary damages under the ADEA, 
under Supreme Court precedent in Kimel v. 
Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S.  62. 
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The case is likely to proceed to briefing 
during the current term and may be 
scheduled for argument in the fall term. 
  
 149 
“Supreme Court to Take on Age Discrimination: Madigan v. Levin” 
Constitutional Law Reporter 
Donald Scarinci 
March 28, 2013 
Now that the same-sex marriage oral 
arguments are in the rear view, it is time to 
focus on the remainder of the 2013 term. 
While the remaining cases may not be as 
groundbreaking, there are a number of 
significant constitutional issues for the 
Supreme Court to tackle. 
For instance, the justices recently agreed to 
take on age discrimination, one of the most 
common types of employment lawsuits. The 
specific issue before the Court is whether 
state and local government employees can 
avoid the federal Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) by bringing age 
discrimination claims directly under the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
The Facts of the Case 
Harvey N. Levin was terminated from his 
position as an Illinois Assistant Attorney 
General at the age of 61. After the office 
replaced him with a younger lawyer, Levin 
filed a lawsuit alleging that his termination 
not only violated the ADEA, but also the 
equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
The defendants, who included the State of 
Illinois, the Office of the Illinois Attorney 
General, Illinois Attorney General Lisa 
Madigan (in both her individual and official 
capacity), and four other individual state 
employees, sought to dismiss the 
Constitutional claim. They argued that the 
ADEA displaced all other remedies for age 
discrimination claims. 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
disagreed, holding that the ADEA does not 
preclude equal protection claims. 
Accordingly, it denied the individual 
defendants qualified immunity. 
The Issues Before the Court 
The Supreme Court likely agreed to hear the 
case because the circuit courts have reached 
divergent results when asked to consider this 
issue. They are currently split 4-1, with the 
Seventh Circuit departing from the others. 
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 
codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “authorizes 
suits to enforce individual rights under 
federal statutes as well as the Constitution” 
against state and local government officials. 
However, in evaluating the limits of relief 
available under § 1983 for statutory claims, 
the Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen the 
remedial devices provided in a particular 
Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they 
may suffice to demonstrate congressional 
intent to preclude the remedy of suits under 
§ 1983.” 
Thus, the key question before the Court will 
be whether Congress intended to limit other 
remedies when including state and federal 
employees under the protection of the 
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ADEA, a determination the Supreme Court generally does not take lightly. 
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“Harvey Levin v. Lisa Madigan, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Decision” 
JD Supra 
Edward Theobald 
August 17, 2012 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit has ruled that Illinois Attorney 
General Lisa Madigan and supervisors of the 
Attorney General’s Office are not entitled to 
qualified immunity from an Equal 
Protection § 1983 Age Discrimination claim 
brought by Harvey Levin, a former Senior 
Assistant Attorney General. 
A three-judge panel acknowledged that its 
decision ran counter to rulings by six other 
circuits that the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) precludes age 
discrimination claims under the Equal 
Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
The Seventh Circuit voted unanimously on 
August 17, 2012 to affirm Northern District 
of Illinois Judge Edmond Chang's July 2011 
judgment in Levin v. Madigan. Judge 
Michael Kanne wrote the opinion, joined by 
Judges William Bauer and Richard Posner 
citing “the ADEA's lack of legislative 
history or statutory language precluding 
constitutional claims, and the divergent 
rights and protections afforded by the 
ADEA as compared to a § 1983 equal 
protection claim." 
"In light of our analysis of the ADEA and 
the relevant case law, and given these 
divergent rights and protections, we 
conclude that the ADEA is not the exclusive 
remedy for age discrimination in 
employment claims," Judge Kanne 
concluded. As for qualified immunity, at the 
time of the alleged violation "it was clearly 
established that age discrimination in 
employment violates the Equal Protection 
Clause," he wrote. "Because Levin's 
constitutional right was clearly established, 
the Individual Defendants are not entitled to 
qualified immunity." 
Harvey Levin was 55 years old in 
September 2000, when he became an 
assistant attorney general in the Illinois 
Attorney General’s consumer fraud bureau. 
Two years later, Illinois Attorney General 
James Ryan promoted Mr. Levin to a senior 
assistant attorney general. In May of 2006, 
the new Illinois Attorney General, Lisa 
Madigan, terminated Mr. Levin despite his 
consistent written performance evaluations 
that met or exceeded the Attorney General’s 
expectations in a dozen job categories. Mr. 
Levin was one of three consumer fraud 
bureau lawyers who were discharged and 
replaced with younger attorneys; Levin's 
replacement was a woman in her 30’s. 
U.S. District Court Judge Edmond E. Chang 
has scheduled the jury trial on Harvey 
Levin’s age and sex discrimination in 
employment complaint for May 6, 2013 in 
the U.S. District Courthouse, 219 S. 
Dearborn Street, Room 1403, Chicago, 
Illinois 60604. 
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“High Court To Mull Circuit Split On Gov't Worker ADEA Claims” 
Law 360 
Bill Donahue 
March 18, 2013 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed 
to weigh in on a circuit split over whether 
state and local government employees can 
directly sue for age discrimination under the 
equal protection clause rather than follow 
the out-of-court procedures of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act. 
The high court will review a Seventh Circuit 
ruling that state workers were allowed to 
bring age discrimination claims under the 
14th Amendment. Other circuits have said 
just the opposite — that the ADEA is the 
exclusive remedy for claims of age-based 
bias and that it forecloses constitutional 
allegations. 
 
The case is significant for government 
employers because the ADEA mandates that 
workers file claims with the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission and 
take other administrative steps before filing 
a complaint. If employees can sue for 
constitutional violations, they can bypass all 
of that. 
 
As is customary, the court didn't indicate 
why it chose to take the case, and Illinois 
Attorney General Lisa Madigan — who 
filed the petition for writ of certorari — 
didn't immediately return a request for 
comment Monday. 
 
Madigan filed her petition in January, 
arguing that the Seventh Circuit's ruling in 
August had exacerbated an already-
confusing divide among lower courts over 
whether the ADEA precludes constitutional 
age bias claims. 
 
“This petition raises an important and 
frequently recurring question over which of 
the lower federal courts are hopelessly 
divided,” the petition said. “The Seventh 
Circuit acknowledged that its holding ... 
created a split with the rule in several other 
circuits [and] this court’s intervention is 
needed to reconcile this growing, nationwide 
split in authority.” 
 
As Madigan explained in her petition, the 
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have 
all ruled that Congress made the ADEA the 
exclusive statutory vehicle for alleged age 
bias. Those courts have rejected efforts to 
sue under 42 USC § 1983 — the rule for 
deprivation of constitutional or other legal 
rights — as precluded by the ADEA. 
 
And in other appeals court jurisdictions that 
haven't addressed the issue, like the Second, 
Third, Sixth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, 
district judges have ruled both ways, further 
muddling the situation, the petition argued. 
 
Madigan pushed the high court to come 
down on the side of the courts that have 
upheld the exclusivity of the ADEA, saying 
that the Seventh's contrary view was 
detrimental to the “proper functioning of the 
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comprehensive scheme that Congress has 
carefully crafted for resolving employment 
disputes.” 
 
“Congress decided that these disputes, 
specifically, should be resolved wherever 
possible through prompt notice and informal 
conciliation rather than litigation,” the 
petition said. “The more than one million 
state and local workers located in Illinois, 
Indiana and Wisconsin may [now] bypass 
the ADEA’s dispute resolution process and 
go straight to court, undercutting the act as a 
means of securing voluntary compliance 
with federal age discrimination laws,” 
Madigan argued. 
 
Former assistant Illinois attorney general 
Harvey N. Levin sued Madigan and her 
office in 2007, claiming he had been fired 
due to his age — he was 55 when terminated 
— and replaced by a female attorney in her 
thirties. He brought claims under both the 
ADEA and the 14th Amendment, via 42 
USC § 1983. 
 
When Illinois and Madigan moved to 
dismiss the constitutional claims because 
they were foreclosed by the ADEA, the 
judge sided with Levin. In August, the 
Seventh Circuit affirmed that ruling, setting 
the stage for the Supreme Court to step in. 
 
An attorney for Levin didn't return a request 
for comment Monday on the grant of 
certioari. 
 
Madigan is represented by Illinois Solicitor 
General Michael A. Scodro. 
 
Levin is represented by Edward 
R. Theobald. 
 
The case is Madigan v. Levin, case number 
12-872, in the U.S. Supreme Court. 
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“Supreme Court Stops Use of Key Part of Voting Rights Act” 
The Washington Post 
Robert Barnes 
June 25, 2013 
A divided Supreme Court on Tuesday 
invalidated a crucial component of the 
landmark Voting Rights Act of 1965, ruling 
that Congress has not taken into account the 
nation’s racial progress when singling out 
certain states for federal oversight. 
The vote was 5 to 4, with Chief Justice John 
G. Roberts Jr. and the other conservative 
members of the court in the majority. 
The court did not strike down the law itself 
or the provision that calls for special 
scrutiny of states with a history of 
discrimination. But it said Congress must 
come up with a new formula based on 
current data to determine which states 
should be subject to the requirements. 
Proponents of the law, which protects 
minority voting rights, called the ruling a 
death knell. It will be almost impossible for 
a Congress bitterly divided along partisan 
lines to come up with such an agreement, 
they said. 
There could be immediate consequences 
from the court’s ruling. Just hours after the 
ruling, Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott 
said his state will move forward with a 
voter-identification law that had been 
stopped by a panel of federal judges and will 
carry out redistricting changes that had been 
mired in court battles. 
The act covers the Southern states of 
Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
South Carolina, Texas and Virginia, as well 
as Alaska, Arizona and parts of seven other 
states. It requires them to receive “pre-
clearance” from the U.S. attorney general or 
federal judges before making any changes to 
election or voting laws. 
Roberts said the court had warned Congress 
four years ago, in a separate case, that its 
decision to continue using a formula based 
on “40-year-old facts” would lead to serious 
constitutional questions. 
“Congress could have updated the coverage 
formula at that time, but did not do so,” 
Roberts wrote. “Its failure to act leaves us 
today with no choice but to declare [the 
formula] unconstitutional.” 
He added, “Our country has changed, and 
while any racial discrimination in voting is 
too much, Congress must ensure that the 
legislation it passes to remedy that problem 
speaks to current conditions.” 
He was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, 
Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas and 
Samuel A. Alito Jr. 
One sign of racial progress has been the 
election of the nation’s first African 
American president, who said Tuesday that 
he was “deeply disappointed” in the 
decision. 
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“For nearly 50 years, the Voting Rights Act 
. . . has helped secure the right to vote for 
millions of Americans,” President Obama 
said in a statement. “Today’s decision 
invalidating one of its core provisions upsets 
decades of well-established practices that 
help make sure voting is fair, especially in 
places where voting discrimination has been 
historically prevalent.” 
In Virginia, the state government 
presumably will no longer need approval 
from Washington for its new voter-ID law. 
The law could still be subject to a legal 
challenge, but the burden would be shifted 
to plaintiffs to show that the law would hurt 
minority voters. 
Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr., who 
called the decision a “serious setback for 
voting rights,” said his department will 
“continue to carefully monitor jurisdictions 
around the country for voting changes that 
may hamper voting rights.” 
“Let me be very clear,” Holder said. “We 
will not hesitate to take swift enforcement 
action, using every legal tool that remains 
available to us, against any jurisdiction that 
seeks to take advantage of the Supreme 
Court’s ruling by hindering eligible citizens’ 
full and free exercise of the franchise.” 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg emphasized the 
liberals’ disagreement with the decision by 
reading her dissent from the bench. She said 
the majority not only misread the lessons of 
the nation’s racial progress but also inserted 
itself into a decision that the Constitution’s 
Civil War amendments specifically leave for 
Congress. 
“When confronting the most constitutionally 
invidious form of discrimination, and the 
most fundamental right in our democratic 
system, Congress’ power to act is at its 
height,” Ginsburg wrote in her dissent. 
She noted that the 2006 extension of the 
Voting Rights Act, and the continued use of 
the formula in Section 4, was approved 
unanimously in the Senate and signed by 
President George W. Bush. “What has 
become of the court’s usual restraint?” she 
asked from the bench. 
She invoked the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. 
and the march from Selma to Montgomery. 
“ ‘The arc of the moral universe is long,’ he 
said, ‘but it bends toward justice’ if there is 
a steadfast commitment to see the task 
through to completion,” Ginsburg said. 
“That commitment has been disserved by 
today’s decision.” 
She was joined in dissent by Justices 
Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and 
Elena Kagan. 
Roberts, too, was ready with history lessons. 
In his opinion, he noted that in 1965, white 
voter registration in Mississippi was nearly 
70 percent and black registration stood at 
6.7 percent. By 2004, a greater percentage of 
blacks than whites were registered to vote in 
the state, and that was true in five of the six 
states originally covered by Section 5. 
“These are the numbers that were before 
Congress when it reauthorized the act in 
2006,” he said. 
Roberts cited the deaths of men registering 
others to vote in Philadelphia, Miss., and 
 156 
“Bloody Sunday” in Selma, Ala. “Today 
both of these towns are governed by 
African-American mayors,” Roberts wrote. 
Yet the “extraordinary and unprecedented 
features” of Section 5, along with the 
coverage formula, were reauthorized “as if 
nothing had changed.” 
Ginsburg said that the longtime formula 
Congress decided to continue using still 
identified the areas most in need of federal 
oversight. Between 1982 and 2006, she said, 
the Justice Department blocked more than 
700 voting changes on the grounds that they 
would be discriminatory. 
She said the court’s ruling does not 
accommodate the evidence Congress 
amassed to justify reauthorization. “One 
would expect more from an opinion striking 
at the heart of the nation’s signal piece of 
civil rights legislation,” Ginsburg wrote. 
Roberts countered: “Congress did not use 
the record it compiled to shape a coverage 
formula grounded in current conditions. It 
instead reenacted a formula based on 40-
year-old facts having no logical relation to 
the present day.” 
Reaction to the ruling was impassioned. 
Edward Blum, who coordinated the current 
challenge to Section 5 and a previous one in 
2009, said the decision “restores an 
important constitutional order to our system 
of government which requires that all 50 
states are entitled to equal dignity and 
sovereignty. Our nation’s laws must apply 
uniformly to each state and jurisdiction.” 
Civil rights groups were outraged. “I think 
we should not soft-pedal what is an 
egregious betrayal of minority voters,” said 
Sherrilyn Ifill, head of the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund, whose lawyers participated in 
the case. 
In his opinion, Roberts noted that the 
decision “in no way affects the permanent, 
nationwide ban on racial discrimination in 
voting” found in another part of the Voting 
Rights Act. And he said that “Congress may 
draft another formula based on current 
conditions.” 
But there appeared to be little bipartisan 
appetite for that on Capitol Hill, and some 
lawmakers said such an attempt would be 
unsuccessful. 
“As long as Republicans have a majority in 
the House and Democrats don’t have 60 
votes in the Senate, there will be no pre-
clearance,” said Sen. Charles E. Schumer 
(D-N.Y.). “It is confounding that after 
decades of progress on voting rights, which 
have become part of the American fabric, 
the Supreme Court would tear it asunder,” 
Schumer added. 
The specific challenge before the court came 
from Shelby County, Ala., a fast-growing, 
mostly white suburb south of Birmingham. 
A brief filed by the state of Alabama said 
bloody resistance to African Americans’ 
voting rights was “particularly responsible” 
for making Section 5 necessary. 
The state’s attorney general, Luther Strange, 
said in the brief that Alabama had a well-
earned place among the covered 
jurisdictions when the act was passed in 
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1965 and reauthorized in 1970, 1975 and 
1982. But the 2006 reauthorization, which 
extended federal control for an additional 25 
years, went too far, he said. 
“It is time for Alabama and the other 
covered jurisdictions to resume their roles as 
equal and sovereign parts of these United 
States,” the brief said. 
The case is Shelby County v. Holder. 
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“U.S. Chief Justice Realizes Longstanding Vision in Voting-Rights Case” 
Reuters 
Joan Biskupic 
June 25, 2013 
For an often enigmatic figure at the U.S. 
Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Roberts 
spoke to the essence of his legal philosophy 
on Tuesday in eliminating a voting-rights 
provision enacted to protect blacks and other 
minorities. 
His opinion for the court marks the 
culmination of an effort by conservatives, 
many of whom, like Roberts, cut their teeth 
in the Ronald Reagan administration, to 
ensure that federal voting requirements on 
the states be limited and race-based rules 
fade in contemporary America. 
In a tenure-defining decision, the Roberts 
majority undercut a key section of the 1965 
Voting Rights Act that requires states with a 
history of racial discrimination to obtain 
U.S. approval before changing election laws. 
The court struck down the formula used to 
determine which states were affected. Nine 
mostly Southern states had been covered. 
The decision was the most significant racial 
ruling since Roberts, 58, became chief 
justice in 2005. Announced on the next-to-
last day of term, Shelby County v. Holder 
was one of the most awaited of the current 
session and as Roberts spoke from the 
bench, the hushed courtroom felt quieter 
than usual. 
CONSERVATIVE PRIORITIES 
Last year at this time, Roberts defied many 
people's expectations when he provided the 
fifth vote to uphold the healthcare overhaul 
sponsored by President Barack Obama. But 
some legal analysts observed that such a 
case, testing federal commerce and taxing 
power, did not touch on his long-held 
conservative priorities. 
When Roberts served as a lawyer in the 
Reagan administration, he sought to curtail 
government's use of racial remedies and 
specifically narrow the reach of the Voting 
Rights Act. In 1982, for example, Roberts 
advised the president to oppose pending 
legislation to enhance a section aimed at 
intentional voter discrimination. 
Roger Clegg, who worked with Roberts at 
the Justice Department in the 1980s, said 
Roberts, like other young Republican 
lawyers, was inspired by a broad socially 
conservative agenda that included such 
subjects as abortion, religion and race. 
"These were the big-ticket items back then," 
said Clegg, now president of the Center for 
Equal Opportunity, a conservative think 
tank. Clegg added that he did not think 
Roberts, who grew up in Indiana and was 
educated at Harvard, was motivated in his 
quest for race-neutral policies by especially 
Southern sympathies. 
"This is not driven by the fact that his great, 
great grandfather was with (Confederate 
General Robert E.) Lee at Appomattox," 
said Clegg, referring to one of the final 
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battles of the Civil War. "It's from his belief 
in federalism," that is, a limit on what 
Congress may constitutionally impose on 
the states. 
Once he joined the high court, as an 
appointee of Republican President George 
W. Bush, Roberts asserted his opposition to 
racial policies. In a 2006 case involving the 
drawing of "majority minority" voting 
districts to boost the political power of 
blacks and Latinos, Roberts referred to "this 
sordid business divvying us up by race." In a 
2007 dispute over school integration plans, 
Roberts wrote, "The way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race." 
In a 2009 case, in which the court ultimately 
declined to review the constitutionality of 
the key Voting Rights Act section, Roberts 
warned that the screening provision may no 
longer be constitutional because "things 
have changed in the South." 
He questioned why Congress would still 
target Southern states when widespread 
blatant racial discrimination had ended. Can 
members of Congress "impose this disparate 
treatment forever because of the history in 
the South?" he asked during oral arguments 
in the 2009 case. "When do they have to 
stop?" 
On Tuesday, Roberts provided an answer: 
Now. 
In his 24-page opinion for the court, Roberts 
criticized Congress for leaving in place the 
criteria for targeted states that traced to the 
1960s and early 1970s, despite the gains in 
voting equality since then. Voicing irritation 
that lawmakers had not acted on the court's 
warning in 2009 to revise the formula used 
to determine which states were covered, 
Roberts said it had no choice but to strike it 
down. 
As he wrote about the changes across the 
country in recent decades, the chief justice 
noted that voter registration rates for blacks 
and whites now approach parity and blatant 
discrimination is rare. 
"Our country has changed, and while any 
racial discrimination in voting is too much, 
Congress must ensure that the legislation it 
passes to remedy that problem speaks to 
current conditions," Roberts wrote, joined 
by his four fellow conservatives. 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, speaking for 
the four liberal dissenters, said the states 
targeted four decades ago still had the worst 
voting-rights violations. She invoked the 
words of slain civil rights leader Martin 
Luther King, Jr.: " 'The arc of the moral 
universe is long, he said, but ‘it bends 
toward justice,' if there is a steadfast 
commitment to see the task through to 
completion. That commitment has been 
disserved by today's decision." 
In the cool marble courtroom on a scorching 
June morning, Roberts was expressionless. 
After decades of tension over the scope of 
voting rights, he had his majority. 
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“U.S. Sues To Block Texas Law On Voter ID” 
The Wall Street Journal 
Jess Bravin 
August 27, 2013 
The Justice Department on Thursday sued 
Texas over the state's voter-identification 
law and said it would join an existing case 
challenging congressional districts drawn by 
Austin's Republican-controlled legislature, 
alleging that both measures violate the 1965 
Voting Rights Act and constitutional 
protections for minorities. 
The lawsuits come after the U.S. Supreme 
Court in June ended nearly a half-century of 
direct federal supervision of election 
practices in states that historically 
discriminated against minority voters. The 
5-to-4 decision found that historical data no 
longer justified requiring Texas and other 
such states to obtain federal permission 
before changing election procedures. 
But the opinion left intact federal law 
authorizing voting-rights suits against state 
and local election laws after they are 
enacted. It also allowed courts to impose 
new "preclearance" requirements on 
jurisdictions found to discriminate against 
minority voters. 
The Obama administration had pledged to 
use those powers vigorously, and on 
Thursday Attorney General Eric Holder said 
the Texas suits underscored that 
commitment. 
"We will not allow the Supreme Court's 
recent decision to be interpreted as open 
season for states to pursue measures that 
suppress voting rights," Mr. Holder said in a 
statement. "This represents the department's 
latest action to protect voting rights, but it 
will not be our last." 
Texas Gov. Rick Perry called the suit "an 
effort to obstruct the will of the people of 
Texas," adding, "We will continue to defend 
the integrity of our elections." 
The Justice Department previously had 
rejected the voter-ID law, a decision upheld 
by a federal court in Washington. That 
ruling was nullified by the Shelby County 
ruling, which eliminated the formula that 
had placed Texas under the preclearance 
requirement. 
The Texas law requires voters to present one 
of five forms of photo ID. A driver's license, 
passport or concealed-handgun license 
issued by the state Department of Public 
Safety are among the accepted forms of ID, 
while student cards aren't accepted. People 
who can prove their eligibility to vote with a 
birth certificate or other documents can 
obtain a special voter-identification card. 
The Justice Department said the law, signed 
by Mr. Perry in 2011, would disadvantage 
minority voters. For instance, the 
department said Hispanic registered voters 
are more than twice as likely as non-
Hispanic registered voters to lack a driver's 
license. 
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The administration also said it would join 
the redistricting suit, which was filed in 
2011 by civil-rights organizations and Texas 
voters, and is pending before a federal court 
in San Antonio. 
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“U.S. Asks Court to Limit Texas on Ballot Rules” 
The New York Times 
Adam Liptak & Charlie Savage 
July 25, 2013 
The Obama administration on Thursday 
moved to protect minority voters after last 
month’s Supreme Court ruling striking 
down a central part of the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965, with the Justice Department asking 
a court to require Texas to get permission 
from the federal government before making 
changes. 
In a speech before the National Urban 
League in Philadelphia, Attorney General 
Eric H. Holder Jr. said the request would be 
the first of several legal salvos from the 
administration in reaction to the Supreme 
Court’s decision. “My colleagues and I are 
determined to use every tool at our 
disposal,” he said, “to stand against such 
discrimination wherever it is found.” 
Last month’s ruling, Shelby County v. 
Holder, did away with a requirement that 
Texas and eight other states, mostly in the 
South, get permission from the Justice 
Department or a federal court before 
changing election procedures. On Thursday, 
the administration asked a federal court in 
Texas to restore that “preclearance” 
requirement there, citing the state’s recent 
history and  relying on a different part of the 
voting rights law. 
Republicans harshly criticized the 
announcement, in a sign that both parties 
view the battle over voting laws as 
important to future elections. 
Gov. Rick Perry of Texas cast Mr. Holder’s 
remarks as an attempt by the Obama 
administration to weaken the state’s voter-
integrity laws and said the comments 
demonstrated the administration’s “utter 
contempt for our country’s system of checks 
and balances.” 
“This end run around the Supreme Court 
undermines the will of the people of Texas, 
and casts unfair aspersions on our state’s 
common-sense efforts to preserve the 
integrity of our elections process,” Mr. Perry 
said in a statement. 
For years, Republicans across the nation 
have pushed for tougher voter identification 
laws, shorter voting hours and other 
measures they say are intended to reduce 
voter fraud. The efforts have intensified 
across the South, from Texas to North 
Carolina, after the Supreme Court’s ruling 
freed many states and localities from federal 
oversight. 
Democrats have said the steps are intended 
to reduce voting by minorities, students and 
other heavily Democratic groups. 
State Representative Trey Martinez Fischer, 
Democrat of San Antonio, who is the 
chairman of the Mexican-American 
Legislative Caucus, said racial 
discrimination in Texas was not a thing of 
the past. 
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“The fact that intervention in Texas is the 
Department of Justice’s first action to 
protect voting rights following the Shelby 
County decision speaks volumes about the 
seriousness of Texas’ actions,” Mr. Fischer 
said. 
“Texans should be proud that the resources 
of the federal government will be brought to 
bear to protect the voting rights of all,” he 
added. 
President Obama mentioned his concern 
about voting problems — especially long 
waits at the ballot box — in both his victory 
speech on the night of his re-election and in 
his second Inaugural Address. Several recent 
polls and studies found that voters in heavily 
Democratic areas face longer lines, although 
the reasons remain unclear. 
The new move by the Justice Department 
relies on a part of the Voting Rights Act that 
the Supreme Court left untouched in the 
Shelby County case. The court struck down 
the coverage formula in Section 4 of the 
law, which had identified places subject to 
the preclearance requirement based on 40-
year-old data. The court suggested that 
Congress remained free to enact a new 
coverage formula based on contemporary 
data, but most analysts say that is unlikely. 
Striking down the law’s coverage formula 
effectively guts Section 5 of the law, which 
requires permission from federal authorities 
before covered jurisdictions may change 
voting procedures. 
The move by the Justice Department on 
Thursday relies on a different part of the 
law, Section 3, which allows the federal 
government to get to largely the same place 
by a different route, called “bail-in.” If the 
department can show that given jurisdictions 
have committed constitutional violations, 
federal courts may impose federal oversight 
on those places in a piecemeal fashion. 
Lawyers for minority groups have already 
asked a court in Texas to return the state to 
federal oversight. The Justice Department’s 
action — filing a “statement of interest” in 
that case — will bring the weight of the 
federal government behind those efforts. 
Richard H. Pildes, a New York University 
professor who specializes in election law 
issues, said the move was “a dramatically 
significant moment in the next phase of the 
Voting Rights Act’s development” after the 
Supreme Court’s ruling. 
“If this strategy works, it will become a way 
of partially updating the Voting Rights Act 
through the courts,” he said. “The Justice 
Department is trying to get the courts to step 
into the role the Justice Department played 
before the Shelby County decision. The 
Voting Rights Act has always permitted this, 
in some circumstances, but this strategy 
wasn’t used much. If this approach works, it 
will help update the Voting Rights Act even 
without Congressional action.” 
In his speech, Mr. Holder said that evidence 
submitted to a court last year that the Texas 
Legislature had intentionally discriminated 
against Hispanics when redrawing district 
lines was sufficient to reimpose on that state 
the “preclearance” safeguard. The court 
blocked the map, saying the parties had 
“provided more evidence of discriminatory 
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intent than we have space, or need, to 
address here.” 
The department may also soon bring similar 
legal action against Texas over its voter 
identification law, which was also blocked 
by a federal court last year. Hours after the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in the Shelby 
County case, the state said it would begin 
enforcing the law. 
Richard L. Hasen, a professor at the 
University of California, Irvine, who 
specializes in election law, said Thursday’s 
filing was a “huge deal showing that the 
department is going to be aggressive in 
seeking to resurrect what it can of the old 
preclearance regime” adding that “getting 
the state of Texas covered again would be 
important not just symbolically but 
practically, as it would put its tough new 
voter ID law back on hold.” 
But Professor Hasen added that trying to 
“bail in” jurisdictions under Section 3 was 
not a substitute for Section 5’s 
comprehensive oversight requirements for 
all of the areas it covered. 
“This is a clunky way to cover only a subset 
of jurisdictions found to be intentionally 
discriminating — a tough legal standard to 
prove,” he said. “And courts have discretion 
to grant or not grant bail-in, and to fashion 
the remedy as they see fit.” 
Mr. Holder urged Congress to reimpose 
more general preclearance requirements. 
The bail-in procedure, he said, is “no 
substitute for legislation that will fill the 
void left by the Supreme Court’s decision.” 
“This issue transcends partisanship, and we 
must work together,” Mr. Holder continued. 
“We cannot allow the slow unraveling of the 
progress that so many, throughout history, 
have sacrificed so much to achieve.” 
 
 
 
 
